The effects of political framing: who is a “refugee?” by Barnhisel, Giulia
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2016
The effects of political framing: who is a “refugee?”
Giulia Barnhisel
University of Colorado Boulder, giulia.barnhisel@colorado.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Political Theory Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barnhisel, Giulia, "The effects of political framing: who is a “refugee?”" (2016). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 1106.
The effects of political framing: who is a “refugee?”   
 
 
 
 
Giulia Barnhisel  
Department of International Affairs, University of Colorado Boulder 
Undergraduate Thesis, 
March 30, 2016 
 
Thesis Advisor:  
Dr. Michaele Ferguson 
 
Defense Committee:  
Dr. Victoria Hunter 
Dr. Carol Conzelman 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This thesis is examining the question: what causes changes in the definition of the 
concept of “refugee” over time? The refugee is often considered a humanitarian concept that 
creates an exception to traditional, security-oriented forms of managing irregular migration. 
However, by analyzing the evolving definition of the refugee, this discourse analysis shows how 
it is a political concept in that it has no single, universally accepted definition and therefore, it can 
be politically manipulated. This is what W. B. Gallie identifies as an “essentially contested 
concept” – a concept that is internally complex and has a variety of contrasting definitions that 
might seem neither absurd nor contradictory until conscious consideration. As such, state actors 
will have an interest in contesting the concept of “refugee” to find a definition that best suits their 
state interests, and, if any one frame becomes dominant in the political discourse on refugees, this 
results in significant framing effects – the ability for political discourse to shape our worldview 
and the policies that reflect it. This thesis argues that the refugee is best understood as a political 
concept that is manipulated by state actors for the purpose of fulfilling particular state interests at 
particular times. By exposing the refugee’s politicized nature through an analysis of the refugee’s 
history and an in-depth case-study of EU-Turkish cooperation in the present “refugee crisis,” we 
can see in what ways the refugee is contested, how states attempt to decontest it, and who has the 
power to form the dominant frame on the refugee.  
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Preface 
 
 Like most of us, I had never really considered the premise of a border. Of course, growing 
up in the US I heard plenty about immigration, but despite its saturation in the daily news, I had 
never second-guessed the value of borders. However, this all changed when I spent the summer of 
2015 working at an NGO in Brussels that deals exclusively with migration and migrant rights 
issues. For the first time, I was exposed to the political minefield of migration and the plethora of 
terms, concepts, and categories that go into it: detention, deportation, legal appeal, unaccompanied 
minors, human trafficking, humanitarian visas, subsidiary protection, family reunification - and 
the list goes on.  
 But the more legal documents I read, the more conferences I attended, and the more 
roundtables I participated in, the more confused I became about migration. In fact, the more time 
I spent thinking about migration, the more migration seemed to be an invented world where borders 
act as these imaginary, arbitrary lines that had been created to separate “us” from “them,” with a 
significant amount of ambiguity in who exactly can cross that line and why. At the center of my 
confusion was the “refugee,” who is somehow able to cross that line and move from the limbo of 
irregularity and into a legal existence. While NGOs such as the one I worked at were primarily 
concerned with how refugees live within their supposed legality – for example, by answering 
question such as “do they have access to the suite of rights that they ought to by the receiving 
country?” – I was most curious about this specific transition from irregularity to regularity. When 
can they cross, why can they cross, and what exactly is a “refugee?”  
Though these were the questions that drove me to pursue this project, refugees are just the 
tip of the iceberg to migration. They are what we in the developed world are most of aware of, and 
even more so today thanks to crises such as the one in Syria that affect developed countries such 
as those in the EU. But beyond a critical analysis of how refugees are used in political speech and 
in migration policy as I do in this thesis, there is much more within the realm of migration that we 
ought to critically consider. We are living in an increasingly globalized world, and as the situation 
becomes more dire for people around the world, they will want to move quicker – and they will be 
able to move in ways that they would not have had the means to have moved before. Additionally, 
as global economic disparity widens, so will the dream to find a better life continue to grow. 
Therefore, I do not believe that our focus on migration will end with a solution to the refugee 
question – instead, refugees are only just the start to a process of rethinking how we define and 
control migration. As our ethnic, racial, and religious identities become more malleable within 
states; language and culture are shared with the click of a mouse between states; and we become 
dual and tri-nationals of multiple states; I believe that migration as we treat it today will change to 
suit our increasingly globalized identities and movements, with refugees constituting just the start 
to a new conversation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the framing effects of refugee discourse 
I. Introduction 
The photograph of a toddler washed up on a Turkish beach galvanized a global call to 
action for the ongoing refugee crisis unfolding in Europe. Alan Kurdi, a Kurdish Syrian refugee 
on his way with his family to seek refuge in the EU via Greece, drowned in the Mediterranean 
along with his mother and his five-year-old brother, Galib. Their surviving father, who fought 
desperately to keep them alive, spent three hours fighting to stay afloat at sea while awaiting rescue 
as his family and eight other refugees perished. Hailing from the Syrian town of Kobani, his family 
made the trek across Turkey and paid $4,500 to join the other 1.8 million migrants who attempted 
to cross into the EU by sea in 2015.1 Lying facedown in bright shorts and a red shirt, 3-year-old 
Alan Kurdi “has given a face to the refugee crisis.”2  
This is how the popular narrative of the infamous toddler goes, and if nothing more, it 
succeeded in sparking an incredible emotional reaction within and outside of the European Union. 
However, contrary to popular belief, Alan and his family had already been living in Turkey for 
three years prior to their departure across the Mediterranean, and furthermore, their final 
destination was Canada – not the EU – where Alan’s aunt currently lives.3 Despite being 
exclusively referred to as “refugees” by media and politicians alike, the family had not been 
granted any refugee status during the time they stayed in Turkey, nor did they submit an asylum 
application in Canada or in Turkey, making them neither refugees nor asylum seekers. In effect, 
                                                          
1 "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts," BBC, February 2016, accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 
2 Adam Withnall, "Aylan Kurdi’s Story: How a Small Syrian Child Came to Be Washed up on a Beach in 
Turkey," Independent, September 2015, Accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/aylan-kurdi-s-story-how-a-small-syrian-child-came-to-be-
washed-up-on-a-beach-in-turkey-10484588.html. 
3 Mark Tran, "Aylan Kurdi: Funeral Held for Syrian Boy Who Drowned off Turkey," The Guardian, September 2015, 
Accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/04/drowned-syrian-boy-aylan-kurdi-
buried-in-kobani. 
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Alan and his family were irregular migrants, residing irregularly in Turkey and attempting to enter 
irregularly into the EU.4 Yet, Alan’s legal history did not stop the press, public or politicians from 
referring to him as a refugee because, as they saw it, “among the often glib words about the 
‘ongoing migrant crisis,’ it is all too easy to forget the reality of the desperate situation facing 
many refugees.”5 But while speaking of glib words, as the face of the refugee crisis, Alan was 
never really a refugee at all, leading us to ask ourselves: What really is a ‘refugee’? 
In this thesis, I will analyze the concept of “refugee” and explain why it has a variety of 
contrasting definitions and why some of these definitions are valued more in certain periods of 
time than they are in others. For example, in the case of Alan, “refugee” is as much a legal 
definition as it is a moral obligation, and yet the two do not overlap – Alan was not a legal refugee 
at all, and yet we might all argue defensively that he indeed was. What, then, is a real refugee? 
The goal of this thesis is to reveal that there is no real refugee; it is not a fixed term we use to 
discuss human rights and humanitarian crises – it is politically loaded, politically influenced and 
politically malleable. The question of who qualifies as a refugee and what that status means at any 
given time depends on who you ask and when you ask it. In this thesis, I will answer the question: 
what causes the refugee’s definition to change throughout time?    
                                                          
4 Irregularity in migration can be contrasted to illegal and legal forms of migration. A migrant could be irregular in 
his or her stay or entry, meaning that he or she does not stay or enter the territory in question through a legal 
avenue. More simply, the migrant is not legal, but this does not mean that he or she is illegal. Illegality entails a 
criminal offense, and in most countries, non-legal entry and stay do not fall under the purview of criminal law. 
Furthermore, from a humanitarian perspective, a human being can never be ‘illegal,’ so the title would be quite 
inappropriate. For an interesting explanation of irregularity versus illegality, please see PICUM (“Why 
'undocumented' or 'irregular'?” PICUM, Accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://picum.org/picum.org/uploads/file_/TerminologyLeaflet_reprint_FINAL.pdf.) 
5 Withnall, "Aylan Kurdi’s Story: How a Small Syrian Child Came to Be Washed up on a Beach in Turkey." 
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II. Methodology 
Essentially Contested Concepts  
 
As seen in the case of Alan, the concept of “refugee” is fluid and attaches when there is a 
perceived worthiness to one humanitarian plea in contrast to another. In this thesis, I will show 
how the refugee is variously describable and how its changing definition converts the refugee into 
a politicized concept with real, political consequences. In order to do this, I will first explain what 
is meant by a politicized refugee. To claim that the refugee is political begins with an 
acknowledgement that it is an essentially contested concept. The idea of “essentially contested 
concepts” comes from W.B. Gallie’s famous essay, in which he defines essentially contested 
concepts as terms that, “when we examine the different uses of these terms and the characteristic 
arguments in which they figure, we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of 
any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use.”6  
This might not seem obvious to the reader when applied to refugees; we may think we have 
some conception of what a refugee is. We would not, for example, confuse a refugee and an 
expatriate, or a refugee and a diplomat. But when asking oneself what the definition of the refugee 
is, one is likely to find him or herself using ambiguous words. Let us assume that a refugee is 
someone in need of protection, as many might assert. We must then ask: what does it mean to be 
“in need”? What is the definition of “protection”? For some, the conditions for being “in need” are 
if the refugee is fleeing war, for others it is fleeing extreme poverty, and for others still it might be 
fleeing political persecution. Protection, on the other hand, might mean providing legal stay by 
granting residence permits, whereas for others protection ought to entail full integration into the 
host society. Indeed, there are many definitions for the word “refugee,” yet prior to conscious 
                                                          
6 W. B. Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, no. 1 (March 12, 
1956): 168. 
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consideration there is nothing absurd or contradictory in any one of these possible rival definitions. 
In order to understand how the refugee is an essentially contested concept, I will break it down 
through the five criteria that Gallie presents in his essay.   
 In order for a concept to be essentially contested, it must first be “appraised in the sense 
that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement”7 (I). This is to say that the concept 
at hand entails some sort of valued quality when applied, and one of these very important 
appraisive concepts is that of the refugee. While refugee movements fall under the category of 
irregular migration,8 they are nevertheless accepted by the receiving state and can even claim rights 
upon their arrival, as enshrined in international law. In contrast, the opposite of an irregular 
“refugee” is an irregular “economic migrant,” who is not accepted by the receiving state and who 
cannot claim any rights at all. Some migrants – such as Alan and his family – are granted the 
appraisive term of “refugee,” pulling global sympathy, public support, and in the ideal 
circumstance, receiving a suite of rights for their protection and integration despite their irregular 
entry or stay.  
Gallie’s second criterion for an essentially contested concept is that “the kind of 
achievement it accredits is always internally complex”9 (II). In other words, there is no generalized 
method or scale for deciding between the different claims made by its users. If we return to Gallie’s 
first criterion that the concept must be appraisive, this assumes that there are those that receive this 
achievement and those who do not. This forces us to then ask, what is a “refugee”? When 
considering this question, we will soon realize we are considering a multitude of factors at a variety 
of levels. For example, we will need to consider the person – who is a refugee? – which might lead 
                                                          
7 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 171. 
8 See note 4 for an explanation on irregularity.  
9 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 171-172. 
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us to consider what obligation this person may pose: what rights does a refugee have? Or from 
whom can a refugee claim these rights? How does a refugee claim his or her rights? This, then, 
might lead us to ask what qualities cause a refugee to become a refugee? And so on.  
If the second criterion is that the term must be internally complex, the third is that “the 
accredited term is initially variously describable,”10 initially in the sense that the term can have a 
variety of contrasting definitions that might go unnoticed by the users until conscious consideration 
(III). Let us consider the question posed above: who is a refugee? We might image that a refugee 
is a person fleeing indiscriminate violence, as are Syrians today. Others might visualize a refugee 
as an individual who is persecuted for his or her political opinions, such as Edward Snowden. A 
refugee could also be someone fleeing religious and ethnic persecution, such as the Rohingya 
today. But are persons fleeing famine in South Sudan refugees? Are Mexicans who cross the US 
border in search of safety and an escape from poverty considered refugees? Are those who have 
been systematically marginalized from society considered refugees, such as the “untouchables” in 
India or the Roma in Europe? These examples represent wildly different circumstances and people, 
and yet we tend to consider many of them refugees without considering why, or who else we might 
also need to include within this scope. These different frames on the concept  
“refugee” are invoked and interchanged all the time, making the refugee variously describable. 
Gallie’s fourth criterion, closely linked to the second and third, is that the term must be 
“open” in character, meaning that its definition is consistently vague enough to support the variety 
of contrasting qualities it might contain (IV).11 This allows the accredited achievement to admit 
“considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances”12 and that such modifications 
                                                          
10 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 172. 
11 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 172.  
12 W. B. Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts,"  172. 
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“cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance.”13 Said differently, the concept will change over 
time and in response to the changing context in which the term is used. At different times, we may 
have answered differently to all of the questions posed above about refugees, and this reflects the 
changing environment in which we define the concept. For example, when the refugee regime 
came into existence, “refugee” was defined as a European fleeing political, ethnic, or religious 
persecution, and this definition reflected the exodus in Europe following World War II. In 1967, 
this definition was expanded to include all people fleeing persecution as well as indiscriminate 
violence, which reflected the need to find a humanitarian response to refugee movements that were 
growing at an alarming rate outside of Europe. Therefore, our understanding of the concept of 
“refugee” will remain consistently vague enough to be reframed according to new situations.  
Through Gallie’s first four criteria, we have established what constitutes a term that has a 
variety of definitions invoked by its users. However, it is in Gallie’s fifth criterion that we 
understand how the concept is “essentially contested” and not just complex. Gallie’s fifth criterion 
is that the term “must be used both aggressively and defensively”14 (V). To use a concept 
aggressively or defensively requires that the user is aware of the rivalrous descriptors present 
within a concept and that he or she consciously ranks one as more valued above the others. As 
such, the user might assert that a certain person is a real refugee, or that their claim for refugee 
status is more deserving than another. Take, for example, Al Jazeera’s article titled, “Why Al 
Jazeera will not say Mediterranean ‘migrants.’”15 Here, the staff at Al Jazeera is aggressively 
pushing their definition of “refugee” by claiming that all those who enter Europe irregularly are 
                                                          
13 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts,” 186. 
14 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 172. 
15 Barry Malone, "Why Al Jazeera Will Not Say Mediterranean 'migrants,'" Aljazeera English, August 20, 2015, 
accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/editors-blog/2015/08/al-jazeera-mediterranean-
migrants-150820082226309.html. 
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de facto refugees, and calling them anything but that would be immoral and incorrect. Contrast 
this to how President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Junker, defends his definition of 
the term “refugee”: “We Europeans should remember well that Europe is a continent where nearly 
everyone has at one time been a refugee. Our common history is marked by millions of Europeans 
fleeing from religious or political persecution, from war, dictatorship, and oppression.”16 Here, 
President Junker is defending the right to asylum by making the claim that everyone in Europe has 
been a refugee, expanding the definition of the refugee to defend his particular use of the term. In 
both cases, we see that the speakers are aware that they have to assert their definition of “refugee” 
in a context in which its definition is contested.  
However, the point of this thesis is not only to unveil the essentially contested nature of 
the refugee, but also to explore the political ramifications of such debate. If Gallie is right in noting 
that a concept that is variously describable and whose rivalrous descriptions seem neither absurd 
nor contradictory prior to conscious consideration, then the ways in which our leaders invoke the 
word “refugee” has the potential to frame our understanding of it and to restructure its value 
without a conscious awareness of this happening. To follow Gallie’s criteria, if “refugee” is an 
appraisive term (I) that has competing definitions (II and III) that coexist within an overarching 
ambiguous understanding that adapts to changing situations (IV), then those who wish to pursue 
their definition as the correct one will argue aggressively and defensively for it (V) and can frame 
the ways in which the public defines the refugee. This is to say that if one of those arguments 
becomes the dominant discourse on refugees, then the variety might very well be “replaced by a 
                                                          
16 Juncker, Jean-Claude. “Time for Honesty, Unity, and Solidarity” State of the Union Address, European 
Commission. Brussels, Belgium. 9 September 2015: 6. Accessed 23 September 2015. 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf. 
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ruthless decision to cut the cackle, to damn the heretics and to exterminate the unwanted.”17 Indeed, 
the significance of the contested nature of the refugee is precisely the fact that the fluidity of its 
definition allows it to be manipulated - either by person or by circumstance or by both - which will 
not only change the dialogue around it, but will also change the real-world policies that affect it. 
In order to explain these political ramifications of a variously describable refugee, I will use the 
framing effect.   
Framing Effect  
  
Studies in the social sciences assert that the framing effect occurs when “logically equivalent 
(but not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different 
options.”18 This would imply that the “problem” at hand is variously describable and that its users 
must choose a definition that they will choose over other competing versions. In turn, this creates 
a frame around a subject – much as a picture frame does to a photograph – that constructs “a 
particular (if incomplete) worldview that enables us to see certain connections, yet occludes 
others.”19  
Let us return to the story of Alan Kurdi, about whom the dominant discourse was that he and 
his family were refugees who deserved protection by the European Union. When the story of Alan 
Kurdi arose, there were several frames from which politicians could choose: they could have 
announced that Alan and his family were actually not refugees and thus refused to offer protection  
because of the Kurdis’ illegitimate migratory status. They could have claimed that Alan was part 
of a dangerous influx of irregular migration that poses a security threat to the EU, which can no 
                                                          
17 Gallie, "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts," 168.  
18 James N. Druckman, "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" The Journal of Politics 63, no. 04 
(November 2001): 1042. Accessed March 1, 2016. 
19 Michaele Ferguson, “W” Stands for Women: Feminism and Security Rhetoric in the Post-9/11 Bush 
Administration," Politics & Gender, no. 1 (2005): 13. doi:10.1017/S1743923X05050014. 
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longer administratively register all those coming through its borders, thereby using Alan’s story as 
a warning to those wishing to make the same journey across the Mediterranean. They could have 
also chosen to place the blame on the smugglers and declared the tragedy not under their scope of 
protection.  
All of these different frames make us understand Alan’s situation differently, and, in turn, 
influence us to adopt different definitions of the refugee and different policies towards refugees. 
If instead, Alan’s fate would have been presented as a possible consequence to those irregular 
migrants who are threatening the EU’s security, then perhaps we would have treated refugees with 
much less humanitarian sympathy. But if we support the tragedy of Alan’s death as exemplary of 
the tragedy of the refugee crisis, then this is sure to widen our definition of “refugee” and inspire 
a greater humanitarian responsibility for their protection. 
There are competing frames that co-exist simultaneously and that will be pushed by different 
actors for different reasons at different times. For example, while Alan might be framed as a 
refugee who has a legitimate, moral claim to state protection, simultaneously another group of 
migrants might be framed as illegitimate, irregular migrants who threaten the security of the EU. 
These contrasting frames could exist at the same time, and it is this variety in value within political 
discourse that is so crucial to evaluate, because it will frame what we qualify as a refugee and what 
we do not.  
In short, frames matter because they will shape our perspective of the refugee as well as refugee 
policy. At any given time, there is a variety of competing frames that can co-exist simultaneously, 
and different actors will push for different frames at different times. However, when a frame 
becomes dominant, it exercises a disproportionate effect on our thinking about refugees, creating 
13 
 
significant framing effects on refugee policy. In the next chapters of this thesis, we will explore 
how a frame because dominant and what framing effects it will have on refugee policy.  
III. Thesis overview  
In this thesis, I argue that the refugee is politicized in that it is an essentially contested 
concept whose definition can be decontested by state actors through the framing effect. States have 
an interest in defining the concept of “refugee” as its status implies an obligation on the state, and 
as such, state actors will attempt to frame the refugee through their discourse according to their 
interests. If this discourse becomes dominant, it will exercise a disproportionate influence on 
shaping our perception of the refugee and on refugee policy. In this thesis, I analyze political 
discourse on refugees throughout time to see how dominant frames have succeeded in reshaping 
our perception of the refugee and on the policies that follow. I argue that behind this shift in 
perception and policy, it is state interests and state power that are the drivers. 
If in this introduction we have established that the refugee is an essentially contested 
concept that can be framed through political discourse, then Chapter 2 will try to answer the 
question: how do dominant frames emerge? I will answer this question by explaining how state 
interests and state power structure and decide which frames become dominant. First, I will show 
that the refugee is primarily contested on two dimensions: its scope and its obligation. Next, I will 
explain how state interests in stability and image drive state actors to decontest the concept of 
refugee, and how these interests coalesce into two primary frames that frequently recur in refugee 
discourse: the securitized frame and the humanitarian frame. Finally, I will end this chapter with 
an explanation of how power decides which state is able to decontest the refugee’s scope and 
obligation and create the dominant frame for the refugee by modeling this through the Suasion 
Game. 
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Once the theoretical framework for refugee framing has been set up, Chapter 3 will look at 
the history of the concept of “refugee” and explore how it has been contested and decontested 
throughout time. Beginning at its origin with the Huguenots and ending with the establishment of 
the present-day refugee regime, I will show how the refugee’s evolving definition throughout 
history has been a product of state power and has evolved due to changing state interests. In each 
period of history that I explore, I will apply the concepts discussed in Chapter 2 to understand how 
state power and state interests have formed the dominant frame on the refugee. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 provides the necessary historical background to understand the case-study presented in 
Chapter 4.  
In Chapter 4, I present an in-depth case study of EU-Turkish cooperation on managing the 
European refugee crisis that shows us a contemporary example of how the refugee is shaped by 
political interests and political power. This chapter will build on the history discussed in Chapter 
3 and it will put the theoretical tools presented in Chapter 2 into practice. In so doing, I will explain 
how the concept of “refugee” remains essentially contested and how it is being actively 
decontested by the EU through its cooperation with Turkey, shifting our understanding of the 
refugee’s scope and obligation to suit the EU’s political priorities. Finally, I will explain how 
power has allowed the EU to achieve its interests and successfully reframe our understanding of 
the refugee, and how this is having serious policy implications for asylum in Europe.  
By exploring the politicized nature of the concept of “refugee,” we can begin to think 
critically about how we value and understand asylum policies within the larger picture of global 
migration. In a time where refugees are making headlines everyday, it is crucial that we deconstruct 
our understanding of asylum in order to evaluate why asylum policies really matter and why 
defining a clear role to play in providing relief to humanitarian crises is so vital to its cause. In this 
15 
 
next chapter, we will gain the theoretical tools to analyze the concept of “refugee” and evaluate its 
underlying purpose.  
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Chapter 2: Political power in refugee discourse  
I. Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the concept of the refugee is political. That is, the refugee is an 
essentially contested concept whose definition varies among political actors, but whose definition 
may be decontested through framing in political discourse. Having said that, the concept of the 
refugee is not always actively contested; at times and in specific contexts, political actors may 
largely agree on a specific definition of “refugee” (for example, when the concept is defined in a 
legal document).  In such moments, the decontested meaning of “refugee” is shaped by the 
dominant political discourse at the time, and this discourse will have significant framing effects 
on public opinion and asylum policy.  
Which political discourse will become dominant and why? In this chapter, I explore how 
state power and state interests determine the dominant discourse on the refugee. More specifically, 
this chapter is meant to offer the theoretical framework for how a powerful20 state goes about 
framing our understanding of the refugee, and how this will result in significant framing effects on 
refugee policy.  
To do this, we must first understand the two parts that make up the concept of “refugee”: 
its scope and its obligation. Over the last century, contestation over the concept of “refugee” has 
clustered around two dimensions: who counts as a refugee, and what states owe to them.  We can 
think of these two dimensions as the scope of who qualifies as a refugee, and the obligation to 
those who are classified as refugees.  States have an interest in defining the scope of “refugee” 
because the broader the definition, the more people who may potentially qualify for its status.  
States also have an interest in defining their obligation to refugees because, if states are obligated 
                                                          
20 For this discussion, the kind of power is not relevant. It could be material or normative power.  
17 
 
to provide for legal stay, work permits, a path to citizenship, etc., these will have corresponding 
policy implications.   
The state does not, however, have just one single, unified interest in refugee matters; 
instead, there are various stakeholders that push and pull on the state to create policies that they 
prefer, and the state must find an appropriate balance between these stakeholders. To simplify this 
diversity, I identify two sets of interests that the state must satisfy when dealing with refugees: 
state stability, which might include concerns about spending, national security, or national identity, 
as well as its image, in which state decisions must appeal to both public opinion and the 
international community with which it cooperates. For example, the public or the international 
community may call on the state to provide greater refugee protection, whereas its political leaders 
may push concerns of national security as a justification for keeping refugee inflows minimal. As 
such, the state will need to find a position that balances these kinds of interests by framing the 
refugee through its political discourse in a way in which it can satisfy both.  
By looking at political discourse, we can see how states satisfy these interests by framing 
the refugee under two contrasting umbrella concepts: the humanitarian frame and the securitized 
frame. A humanitarian frame can be understood as rhetoric that places greater concern on the well-
being of the refugee, whereas a securitized frame would frame the refugee as posing a threat to 
state stability. Broadly speaking, state actors will jump between these two frames to satisfy their 
interests in maintaining stability and a positive image. For example, a state may invoke a 
humanitarian frame in order to portray the image that it is prioritizing humanitarian concerns. 
Conversely, the state might invoke a securitized frame when it is most concerned with state 
stability.  
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Finally, I will explain how one frame becomes dominant at a given time, thereby 
decontesting the concept of the refugee. In order to do this, I will show how political power 
influences which political discourse will become dominant through the Suasion Game. The 
Suasion Game is a game theory that recognizes uneven state interests and state power within 
international cooperation, resulting in an outcome that will always favor the stronger state over the 
weaker one. As such, the frame adopted by the dominant state will have a disproportionate 
influence on reshaping our understanding of the refugee’s scope and its obligation, which will have 
significant framing effects on refugee policy.     
II. Refugee Framing 
The contesting scope and obligation of the refugee   
As I have established in the introduction to this thesis, the refugee is an essentially 
contested concept in that it is variously describable and whose definition is malleable. If we take 
this a step further and divide the refugee into its two most basic parts, we see a necessity to define 
the scope for who qualifies as a refugee, and the obligation that refugees create on the receiving 
state. In other words, if a refugee is broadly described as a person in need of protection, then there 
is a requirement to define what qualifies as being “in need” and what exactly is the “protection” 
that the state must offer. There are several competing definitions of both qualities present in 
political discourse at any given time. 
The scope: The scope of refugee status refers to the extent to which this status can be applied. Put 
differently, it is the number of causes that can justify receiving the status of “refugee.” We may 
perceive a legitimate cause for becoming a refugee as ranging from indiscriminate violence, civil 
war, political, religious, or ethnic persecution, extreme poverty, famine, or natural disasters – to 
name just a few. There is certainly a variety of causes that we identify as generating refugees, 
though the legal parameters set are not nearly as far-reaching and their scope varies from state to 
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state. For example, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that a legitimate 
cause is based upon “a well-founded fear of being persecuted.”21 This Convention, signed by 156 
countries, would therefore exclude persons fleeing indiscriminate violence, famine, generalized 
war, extreme poverty and natural disasters. In contrast, the Organization of African Unity’s 1969 
Convention extends their cause to acts of external aggression, occupation, domination by foreign 
powers or serious disturbances of public order.22 While we might envision the refugee as a person 
fleeing any variety of these definitions, we may be unaware that there is no single definition to 
who qualifies as a refugee and how the state legally determines this qualification. Even the 
dictionary provides an equally ambiguous definition for the scope of “refugee”: “A person who 
has been forced to leave his or her home and seek refuge elsewhere, esp. in a foreign country, from 
war, religious persecution, political troubles, the effects of a natural disaster, etc.”23  
The obligation: Once the scope of the term “refugee” has been defined by the state, it will then 
need to determine what kind of obligation that status confers. For a large majority of us, being a 
refugee constitutes no claim for any special rights; we perceive refugees as people in need of 
protection but without having necessarily received it. From the state’s perspective, this is rarely 
the case.24 Being a refugee requires, at some level, that the state offers some form of protection. In 
the 1951 Convention, this protection is enshrined in the principle of non-refoulement, which bars 
                                                          
21 "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," UNHCR, (December 2010): 14, accessed March 14, 
2016. http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. 
22 OAU Convention on Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, September 10, 1969, UNTS 1, 
no. 14691 (1969), 3. 
23 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “refugee,” accessed March 10, 2016. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161121?p=emailAsbvB1vw/tLV.&d=161121 
24 This is with the assumption that the state cares about its image, its public, and its security. Not addressing 
refugee movements could destabilize state security and it would likely come at a human cost, one which the public 
and international community would condemn. However, imagine that this is an autocratic regime with no public 
oversight - then maybe public opinion is no longer a central concern. This is also the case if it is the state that is 
generating refugees outflows; it probably does not care much about its obligation to refugee protection. Please 
see the limitations section of the conclusion to read more.  
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a state from returning a refugee or asylum who fears for his or her life or freedom on the basis of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.25  
Many other states have extended their obligation in providing refugee protection in their 
own legislation to varying degrees. For example, Denmark offers free Danish courses and 
integration lessons for up to five years, as well as legal access to employment, residence, and 
education.26 Turkey, on the other hand, offers legal stay to refugees but does not provide access to 
education, healthcare, or work permits. UNHCR defines this obligation as having “at least the 
same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of 
thought, of movement, and freedom from torture and degrading treatment,”27 which allows for 
quite significant variation in the interpretation of what exactly these rights should include. The 
kind of obligations that a refugee imposes are contested among actors and among states, with no 
standardized or universal definition in asylum policies.  
The two aspects of state interest: image and stability  
 However, it is not obvious how states will try to decontest the scope and obligation of the 
refugee because states have competing interests in state stability and image that it must account 
for. In any state and at any time, there is a variety of stakeholders that have an interest in defining 
what is the cause and the obligation that a refugee imposes. For the purposes of this discourse 
analysis, I simplify the variety of interests under two predominant, overarching concerns that the 
state must account for: its image and its stability. 
                                                          
25 Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, “The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion,” 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001): 89, http://www.unhcr.org/419c75ce4.html. 
26 "25 SPØRGSMÅL OG SVAR OM FLYGTNINGE," The Danish Refugee Council, 2015, accessed March 22, 2016, 
https://flygtning.dk/nyheder-og-fakta/25-spørgsmål-og-svar-om-flygtninge. 
27 “Protecting Refugees: questions and answers,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 2002, 
accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/3b779dfe2.html. 
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Image: The state does not exist in a political vacuum and it must consider the feedback of its public 
and the international community with which it cooperates when forming its rhetoric around 
asylum. For example, if the public calls on the state to provide greater refugee protection or grant 
asylum to more people in need, then the state will have an interest in satisfying, at least partially, 
that call. Similarly, the state will also have an interest in appealing its frame to the international 
community. Due to the transnational character of refugees whose solutions require international 
cooperation, the state must consider the image it projects to its international audience when 
forming its rhetoric and policy on asylum.  
Stability: The other concern that will affect how the state will frame the refugee will be its stability. 
Even if public opinion calls on the state to open up its borders and allow in more refugees, the state 
will need to consider the impact this might have on state stability. This might be in terms of 
budgeting – how can we afford to pay for housing complexes, integration courses, and health and 
education access to a large number of refugees? It might also come in terms of cultural protection: 
how will the influx of refugee change the religious and cultural make-up of our state? Or, it might 
also come in the form of national security: how could the impact of unregistered and 
undocumented migrants affect our national security? To answer any of these questions, the state 
might respond by tightening border security in order to satisfy the concern of state stability, even 
if it is at the expense of asylum seekers and persons in need of protection.  
 While I am drawing a distinction between stability and image, these are not always as 
distinct in practice. Stability interests have to do with how a state actor understands the interests 
of the state in terms of security, cultural cohesion, economic stability, border security, national 
defense etc. Image interests have to do with how a state actor understands the interests of the state 
in maintaining or projecting a certain image to its domestic and international 
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audiences. Sometimes these two interests overlap: for example, if the public and international 
community are primarily concerned with state security, then the concern of image and stability 
become two faces on the same coin. Furthermore, in practice, individual political actors may not 
distinguish image and stability neatly (as in, someone may think that our security is best served by 
projecting the image that we are deeply concerned about humanitarian issues).  However, other 
times they are very distinct (such as where a state actor is concerned with economic stability, 
regardless of how that might impact the state's image). By analyzing what has caused shifts in the 
framing of “refugee” throughout time, I see that a change in the balance of these two state interests 
are at the root of the shift. 
The framing effect: Two competing frames in political discourse  
Depending on how state actors understand their state interests in stability and image, they 
will attempt to decontest the refugee accordingly through framing. I identify two broadly defined, 
contrasting frames that are placed on the refugee in political discourse: the securitized frame and 
the humanitarian frame. Both frames exist simultaneously at any given moment within political 
discourse, but the dominance of one frame over another depends on the balance between state 
interests in image and stability. Generally speaking, we can say that the humanitarian frame is 
invoked when the state is most concerned about its image, whereas the securitized frame will be 
invoked when the state is most concerned with its stability. In both cases, we see that the frames 
are used according to state interests, so a humanitarian frame does not necessarily indicate that a 
state is adopting a purely altruistic stance; it indicates that the state has an interest in adopting a 
humanitarian frame – perhaps to maintain public opinion or because it is politically appropriate. It 
is important that we understand these two frames because their interplay will have framing effects 
on how we conceptualize the refugee and the policies that follow.  
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The humanitarian frame: A humanitarian frame is discourse that places a greater concern for 
human safety and human rights than other competing concerns. In the context of “refugee,” a 
humanitarian frame would place the greatest concern on the safety, security, and well-being of 
“refugees,” thereby deprioritizing other concerns such as public safety, cultural cohesion, or the 
economy. Take for example UK Prime Minister David Cameron who announced, two days after 
the emergence of the photo of Alan washed up on shore, that the UK “would act with our head and 
our heart” to take in “thousands more” Syrian refugees.28 This rhetoric undoubtedly places 
emphasis on the human dimension of the refugee crisis over other concerns, such as fears for the 
future integration of refugees or the state’s economic capacity to support their stay.  
Additionally, David Cameron might have invoked this strong humanitarian frame to 
appease the British public who were outraged like the rest of Europe at the photo of the drowned 
toddler and who have been particularly critical of the British government for not taking in more 
refugees in resettlement schemes. Knowing that much of the public was calling for stronger 
solidarity in refugee protection, Cameron responded to the death of Alan with the appropriate 
message to project his desired image: a sincere and ready-to-help United Kingdom.  
The securitized frame: The humanitarian frame can be contrasted to the securitized frame, in 
which political discourse places a greater concern on state stability over other competing concerns. 
In the context of the refugee, a securitized frame exists when politicians place exceptional 
emphasis on matters of state security, pitting the refugee on one side of the spectrum and security 
on the other. Out of the Copenhagen School, securitization is the process by which state actors 
transform subjects into matters of 'security'; it is an extreme version of politicization that enables 
                                                          
28 Matt Dathan, “David Cameron announces Britain will accept 'thousands more' Syrian refugees,” Independent, 4 
September 2014, accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-
announces-britain-will-accept-thousands-more-syrian-refugees-10486136.html. 
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extraordinary measures to be used in the name of security.29 As such, a securitized frame generally 
identifies refugees and asylum seekers in the way that the state traditionally regards irregular 
migration: “as a threat, an invasion, a conquest, a plague or even a ‘rape of the motherland.’”30  
Of course, framing the refugee as an issue of security does not need to go to such extremes. 
Instead, politicians might frame an influx of asylum seekers as “irregular migrants” instead of as 
“refugees” in order to present their entry as a security threat rather than a humanitarian need. For 
example, Jøran Kallmyr, Norwegian State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 
told Newsweek that, “[The government] does not have a duty to protect economic migrants. What 
we are obliged to do is to give direction to those coming from direct persecution,”31 claiming that 
those coming through their borders are not migrants who are deserving of refugee status. In another 
example of securitized speech, Prime Minister of France Manuel Valls said at the World Economic 
Forum that, “we cannot accept, and we cannot say, that all the refugees - anyone fleeing the terrible 
war in Iraq or Syria - can be welcomed in Europe. Otherwise, our society will be destabilized.”32 
In both examples, state security concerns prevail over other concerns, such as the well-being of 
those seeking refuge in their countries. Unsurprisingly, securitized rhetoric will also often reflect 
a greater concern for state stability than for other concerns.  
 These are not, however, the only two topics that frame the refugee, nor do they exist 
entirely separate from each other. Rather, a state actor could portray humanitarian concern while 
                                                          
29 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998): 25. 
30 Timothy Christenfeld, “Alien Expressions, Wretched Refuse is Just the Start,” (New York Times, 10 March 1996): 
13. 
31 Natalie Ilsley, “After welcoming refugees, Europe is saying no more,” Newsweek, 25 November 2015, accessed 
March 10 2016,  http://www.newsweek.com/after-welcoming-refugees-europe-saying-no-more-398261. 
32 “Migrant crisis: EU at grave risk, warns France PM Valls,” BBC, 22 January 2016, accessed March 10, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35375303. 
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still emphasizing security interests, as did Prime Minister Valls. Politicians do not exist in a moral 
vacuum and their biases are not black and white as either security-concerned or humanitarian. This 
is why I focus on the dominant discourse, because among a diversity of rhetoric, we can find 
consistent themes in refugee discourse that attempt to color political intentions under different 
hues. Rather than discussing every frame that an actor might invoke when discussing refugee 
matters, I focus on the two primary, overarching and contrasting themes in which refugee discourse 
resides, much as I focus on two concerns that drive the state to invoke these frames. By analyzing 
political discourse on refugees through the humanitarian or securitized frames, we can better 
understand how state actors attempt to decontest the concept of “refugee” according to their state 
interests in image and stability, and why framing matters in shaping public perception and policies.  
III. The framing effect and power: The Suasion Game 
 I have just explained how the definition of the refugee is contested along two dimensions: 
scope and obligation; and I have explained what state interests are at play when decontesting these 
definitions: image and stability; and finally, I showed how these interests will expose themselves 
in political discourse through securitized or humanitarian framing. If, then, we know that the 
definition of the refugee is influenced by political interests that are expressed through political 
discourse, who is it that gets to form the dominant frame on the refugee? In domestic politics, we 
might begin our study of dominant political rhetoric with the President and his cabinet, who will 
share a position towards refugee policies and, as the leaders of their country, will have significant 
framing effects on the ways the public understands the refugee and the policies that will be created 
in response. In international politics there is no executive branch or proclaimed global authority, 
and as such, dominant political discourse must be understood through the lens of power politics. 
In this section, I will explain the international dimension to refugee framing and how power factors 
into determining which state gets to build the dominant frame within the international arena. To 
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help model this, I will use the Suasion Game to explain why the stronger state will always create 
the dominant frame on the refugee.   
 The refugee requires us to look at it from an international, rather than domestic, level 
because the concept is de facto international in scope: the migrant will move from one country to 
another, taking with him his language, culture, religion, politics, morals, and values when he enters 
into a new state. Though the state-asylum seeker relationship might not qualify as international 
relations, deciding who counts as a refugee and what ought to be its protection does. This is 
because, in the little academic work that evaluates refugee politics under the tenets of international 
relations, it has been suggested that refugee protection is a global public good.33  A public good is 
a good that has the properties of nonexcludability and nonrivalry.34 In other words, once provided, 
benefits conferred by the good (1) cannot be withheld from other members of the community and 
(2) do not diminish or become scarce when enjoyed by another actor. A common example of a 
public good in domestic politics is street lighting: once granted it cannot be withheld from any 
other members and it does not become scarce as more members gain access to it.  
However, I would disagree with Suhrke’s argument that refugee protection is a global 
public good, because I do not believe that in practice its benefits will accrue equally to all members 
of the international community. Because refugee flows tend to stay within the region of the conflict 
that generated them, the states in closest proximity to the conflict will have the greatest benefit in 
global refugee protection than will those in further proximity. By consequence, the interests of the 
                                                          
33 Astri Suhrke, "Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National 
Action," Journal of Refugee Studies, 1998: 409.  
34 Alexander Betts, Protection by Persuasion International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009): 25. 
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state in providing refugee protection are not equal, characterizing refugee protection as a regional 
public good, instead of a global public good.  
Furthermore, it is not only the interests of states that are uneven, but also the power that 
structures these interests. We know that states vary in their relative power and that they will use 
this power to obtain their interests and goals within the international community. In the case of the 
refugee, a state will be interested in defining the refugee’s scope and obligation, and it will use its 
power to decontest the refugee within the international community. A state’s ability to reframe the 
definition of the refugee depends on the political power of that state within the international 
community. This is what Andrew Betts calls the North-South impasse,35 which describes the ability 
of stronger states within the Global North to define the terms of cooperation on refugee protection, 
regardless of what weaker states within the Global South are asking for. I extend his argument and 
apply it to discourse and framing: since the definition of the refugee’s scope and obligation are not 
set, they can be manipulated by powerful states in order to achieve their desired outcome in refugee 
protection for which they will be particularly interested if they are considerably affected by refugee 
movements.   
Betts models this through the Suasion Game, an alternative to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
which cannot reflect this scenario as it assumes actors have symmetrical interests and power 
relations.36 Instead, the Suasion game presents a situation in which either weaker actor A has a 
dominant strategy to cooperate that stronger actor B can exploit, or stronger actor B has a dominant 
strategy to defect, and weaker actor A must cooperate to avoid an even worse outcome. In either 
case, the weaker actor’s preferred strategy is to cooperate – either because noncooperation is not 
                                                          
35 Alexander Betts, Protection by Persuasion International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, 13. 
36 Ibid, 32. 
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practically viable or because it would lead to even greater loses. On the other hand, the stronger 
actor is in a position to choose to defect and that will likely be its preferred option. Suasion games 
have only a single equilibrium outcome (CD), which satisfies only one actor and leaves the other 
aggrieved – “the strong actor B will always exploit the weaker actor A.” 37 
The Suasion Game 
 Actor B  
C D 
Actor A  C 4, 3 3, 4*  
D 2, 2 1, 1 
Number left of comma refers to A’s preference ordering. Number on the right of comma refers to 
B’s preference ordering. 
(1 = worst outcome; 4 = best outcome). * indicates the equilibrium. 
Let us examine the Suasion Game in the context of political discourse and framing. The 
refugee’s scope and obligation are contested concepts that have a variety of definitions at any given 
time among state actors. If a stronger actor wishes to push his or her definition as the best or the 
most correct one within the international arena, his or her frame will become dominant. If a weaker 
actor chooses to defect and continues to push his or her own definition to try and incite more or 
less cooperation on protection, the weaker actor will not gain anything because it does not have a 
dominant strategy to persuade the stronger actor to adopt its particular decontested definition of 
the refugee. Conversely, if the weaker actor chooses to accept the terms of cooperation and to 
adopt the dominant frame on the refugee, it will never achieve all of its interests, but it will still be 
more the favorable strategy than defection in which the weaker actor would receive no concessions 
at all. As such, the dominant frame of the refugee will always be constructed and supported by the 
stronger state, and this frame will be formed according to their state interests in stability and image. 
                                                          
37 Alexander Betts, Protection by Persuasion International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, 44. 
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As such, the dominant frame will always be favorable to the stronger actor than to the weaker one, 
as the equilibrium outcome of the Suasion Game supposes.  
To think of the Suasion Game in more practical terms, we can use its structure to explain 
why one frame on the refugee will become dominant at any given time. As I will show in both the 
history of the refugee and the case study in Chapters 3 and 4, what causes a shift in the dominant 
frame of the refugee is due to the shifting state interests of the stronger states. Because the refugee 
can be considered a regional public good, it will only become decontested by the stronger states 
once they are directly affecting, causing them to reframe their state interests and how they wish to 
define the refugee’s scope and obligation in response. Ultimately, what the Suasion Game presents 
and what I argue throughout this thesis is that state interests and state power are the drivers to 
refugee policy change over time.   
IV. Conclusion 
This section has provided the theoretical framework for this thesis, whereas the subsequent 
chapters will bear out this argument with empirical evidence. As we explored in Chapter 1, the 
refugee is an essentially contested concept whose framing through political discourse can have 
effects on how we perceive the refugee and the policies that are created in response. In this chapter, 
we take this understanding a step further and explore under what conditions “refugee” is 
decontested and under what circumstances one frame becomes dominant.  
To begin, we had to understand along what dimensions the refugee is contested and why a 
state might have an interest in decontesting it. The concept of “refugee” can be divided its two 
contested parts: its scope and its obligation. A state has an interest in defining its scope because 
this will determine under what circumstances a person will qualify for refugee status, so that if the 
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scope is wider, a larger number of people can be considered as refugees, and vice versa. Related, 
the state will also have an interest in defining the obligation that these refugees impose on the state.  
When decontesting the refugee’s scope and obligation, the state will need to take into 
account its interests in image and stability. While sometimes these two qualities can overlap and 
may not be quite as neat in practice as they are analytically, they give us an understanding for what 
drives the two rhetorical frames that follow. Therefore, we could say that a concern for a favorable 
image is related to humanitarian rhetoric, whereas a concern for state stability would relate to a 
securitized rhetoric. It is in the interplay of these two frames that we can pick apart the underlying 
political interests in framing.  
While all states might have a stake in defining the scope and obligation of the refugee, only 
states with more relative power can successfully create a dominant frame on the refugee. Explained 
through the Suasion Game, states have uneven interests and uneven power that shapes their 
cooperation on refugee protection. As a regional public good, refugee movements do not affect all 
states equally, so some states will have more at stake for how the definition of the refugee’s scope 
and obligation is set than do others. As such, it is once a stronger state is directly affected by 
refugee flows that we see a significant change in the framing of “refugee.” This is because, if a 
state has more relative power, then it will successfully decontest the refugee according to its state 
interests and thereby form the dominant frame on the refugee.  
The story of how states contest and decontest the refugee is not a simple one. The refugee 
presents an obligation on the state for protection but as a contested concept, neither its scope nor 
its obligation has been universally defined. As such, states will have an interest in decontesting its 
definition in order to define the obligations that they would be willing to accept. However, because 
refugee movements do not affect states equally, there are uneven interests and uneven power that 
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creates an equilibrium that will always favor the stronger state over the weaker one. In terms of 
rhetoric, this means that the stronger state will succeed in creating a dominant frame on the concept 
of “refugee,” and this discourse will have significant framing effects on asylum policy. In this 
chapter, I have taken the time to explain this complicated framework to decontesting the refugee, 
and in the next chapter, I will show how state power and state interests have framed and reframed 
the refugee throughout history. 
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Chapter 3: Historical analysis of the political manipulation of “refugee”  
I. Introduction 
 How has the concept of “refugee” been decontested throughout its history?  Whereas the 
previous chapters laid out the theoretical claims, here I will demonstrate them throughout the 
history of the refugee. First, I will show how the concept of “refugee” is essentially contested in 
its origins with the Huguenots in 17th century France. Next, I will look at the first multilateral 
cooperation on refugee protection during the time of the League of Nations, and how this greatly 
politicized the refugee and made it into a geopolitical prop for powerful states. Next, I will look at 
the construction of the contemporary refugee regime that emerged after World War II and devolve 
its explicit and implicit Eurocentric frames in order to see how states continued to manipulate the 
frame on the refugee’s scope and obligation to suit their interests. Finally, we will look at how the 
refugee regime remains ‘half-complete’ today, with a highly contested definition of the refugee’s 
obligation that allows it to be manipulated and decontested through international cooperation.   
In short, this chapter will allow us to apply the concepts presented in Chapter 2 to a wide 
variety of cases. I will evaluate the history of the refugee through the lens of power politics and 
state interests and in so doing, I will explain how state actors have utilized their political power to 
create a dominant frame on the refugee. More importantly, this history will shed light on the 
political dimension of the refugee that is arguably much more powerful than its humanitarian 
appearance. This chapter will provide the necessary background for understanding the case-study 
on Turkey-EU cooperation on refugee policy presented in Chapter 4, building the framework for 
how the refugee is contested, controlled, and reframed by state interests throughout time.   
II. Origin of the refugee: French Huguenots  
The term “refugee” first emerges in 17th France, and while we might believe that “refugee” 
has had a single definition which was established when it was first coined, we find that its original 
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meaning was very different from the contemporary definition of “refugee” today. In this section, 
we will see how the refugee was an essentially contested concept at its origin and how its definition 
changes meaning according to changing political circumstances.  
During the 1700s, France experienced growing tensions between the minority Protestants, 
known as the Huguenots, and the Catholic majority, leading to several small wars in Southwestern 
France. In order to quell the religious fighting, Henry the IV issued the Edict of Nantes in 1598 
that granted religious and political freedom to the Huguenots. However, the Edict of Nantes was 
revoked in 1685 when Louis the XIV passed the Edict of Fontainebleau, which once again limited 
the autonomy of the Huguenots and was followed by violent religious persecutions throughout 
France, including mass killings, torture, and expulsion from the job market and education system.  
Though many French Huguenots might have liked to flee France, Article 10 of the Edict 
placed a “ban on members of the Reformed Church emigrating – on pain of the galleys for men 
and prison for women.”38 As such, coming from the French verb refugier, meaning to ‘take shelter; 
to protect’,39 the Huguenots se sont refugiés within France, defining the first “refugees” as 
internally displaced persons.  In other words, the world’s first refugees were a matter of domestic 
persecution and not a cross-border or transnational issue.  
Interestingly, this is in stark contrast to every contemporary definition of a refugee that 
exists today, showing us that the refugee is, and has always been, a contested concept. As defined 
in the 1951 Convention – to which 156 have signed – a refugee is someone who, "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
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particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable 
to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."40 The fact 
that a refugee was someone internally displaced in 17th century France indicates that the 
circumstances under which refugees found themselves were different then they are today.  
However, these circumstances did not just arise on their own; instead, political decisions 
created a politicized refugee - one that suited state stability concerns at the time. Indeed, during 
the 16th and 17th century, emigration was banned and movement was severely restricted between 
powers in Europe. Feudal states viewed their peasantry as valuable manpower if an army needed 
to be assembled, and as having agricultural utility during peacetime, and thus pursued strict laws 
against emigration into other kingdoms or states. It was in the interest of the state to restrict 
movement, causing the scope of the first “refugee” as being defined as an internally displaced, 
religiously persecuted person.   
The major implication of defining the scope of the refugee as being internally displaced is 
that there is no obligation on any other state to deal with them. By the time of the Edict of 
Fontainebleau, the Treaty of Westphalia had already been signed and put into force in Western 
Europe, so neighboring states had no right and no obligation to step into French territory to call 
foul on the treatment of their religious minorities. Therefore, in 17th century France and elsewhere 
in Europe, refugee status was only defined in its scope (such as those facing religious persecution), 
but created no obligation on any state. Conversely, a refugee found outside of his or her country 
of origin requires not only a definition for the scope of who qualifies as a refugee, but also the 
obligation that the refugee creates on the receiving state. This would mean that having internally 
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displaced “refugees” would not imply any responsibility on the state, suiting the Westphalian 
system and the interest in maintaining state stability at the time.  
III. World War I: the geopolitical gain in defining the refugee’s scope 
It was not until the term was applied to persons fleeing outside of their national borders 
that the concept of the “refugee” accrued political significance. In the aftermath of World War I, 
European states needed to develop a response to the massive influx of displaced persons pouring 
into their borders. In the interwar period between World War I and II, we see a trend to define the 
refugee’s scope and obligation as however would be most politically advantageous to the strongest 
states, who at this time were the victors of World War I and housed within the League of Nations. 
This section is intended to expose the political manipulation of the definition of “refugee,” and 
show how state interests in stability and image led state actors to prioritize certain vulnerable 
groups over others, irrespective of their actual humanitarian needs.  
With the break-up of multi-ethnic empires and the end to one of the most violent wars in 
history, World War 1 launched the first cross-border humanitarian exodus in Europe, and with 
that, introduced our first international and politicized refugee. Concerned with uncontrolled 
immigration and fearing huge flows of displaced people that would threaten the stability of the 
region, European governments rushed to erect protective barriers, close borders and expel 
thousands, thereby refusing any obligation in providing humanitarian relief to those seeking 
international protection. Against this backdrop of increased securitization, the massive refugee 
flows generated by World War 1 and the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia overwhelmed the 
capacity of the private charitable agencies that were striving to provide the relief that their 
governments were unwilling to grant. In 1921, these agencies, represented by the Red Cross, 
appealed to the League of Nations to establish a central coordinating office to address the question 
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of refugees. In response, the League created a temporary position of “High Commissioner on 
behalf of the League in connection with problems of Russian refugees in Europe”, which later 
became more generally, the “High Commissioner to Refugees.”  
Its original title reflects its pragmatism and selectivity; powerful states housed within the 
League of Nations were more concerned with state stability than humanitarianism, and therefore 
kept the scope of refugee status deliberately narrow so as to minimize their obligation. Their 
interest in expanding the scope of the refugee depended upon the problem or political bargaining 
chip it could generate for them as the receiving states. Recognizing that they would need to 
confront with the issue of refugees one way or another, Europeans powers began granting refugee 
status to specific nationalities in an ad hoc fashion through the Office of the High Commissioner 
to Refugees. Beginning with the Russians in 1922, the High Commissioner went on to grant 
refugee status to Germans, Armenians, Hungarians, and Austrians through the ‘Nansen Passports’, 
named after High Commissioner Nansen who was particularly innovative and influential in 
extending refugee protection.  
Nonetheless, all recognized refugees receiving the “Nansen Passports” were granted 
protection only because they did not represent a political threat to the state actors who made up 
the League of Nations. Additionally, all those granted refugee status came from countries that were 
not allied with the League, giving Contracting States within the organization a positive image to 
their domestic and international audiences. This image was that the Contracting States were more 
politically stable and culturally desirable in that nationals from their opposing states were seeking 
refuge within their territory. A double-bladed sword, those receiving Nansen Passports sent a 
message to those outside of the League that the Contracting States held and retained the most 
power and stability within the international system.   
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  In order to avoid any pressure to recognize all political dissidents of any state and not just 
those that were geopolitically favorable, governments refrained from adopting a universal 
definition of “refugee” that would be upheld in the High Commission’s Office in the League of 
Nations and imposed on its members.41 Instead, they extended refugee status to nationalities in an 
ad hoc fashion, keeping the protection granted minimal and the mandate of the High Commissioner 
deliberately narrow.42 For example, the League of Nations did not extend refugee status to Italian 
or Spanish persons fleeing Fascism and dictatorship, as both countries were Contracting States to 
the League.43 The Italian government had strenuously opposed the inclusion of Italian refugees, 
and most of the member states of the League Council were not willing to provoke Mussolini “on 
such a comparatively minor issue.”44 All political refugees from within the League were 
considered an embarrassment to the organization and to the states within it,45 and so they turned 
their attention to nationalities that were more politically favorable. This explains the immediate 
extension of refugee status to Germans and Austrians, who were coming from the dissolving 
empires of the Central Powers and who had lost the war to the Allies.  
We can see how defining the scope of refugee status is manipulated according to the 
interests of the dominant powers in the international system when we take a comparative look 
outside of Europe. I have explained how defining the “refugee” was led by state interests and that, 
during the time of the League of Nations, we can begin to see the refugee as a political tool not in 
its own rite, but whose value is determined by one state’s geopolitical position, and the other state’s 
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potential geopolitical gain. This is perhaps best exemplified by the exclusion of any refugee 
concerns outside of Europe at the time. Looking within Europe, we are reminded that the region 
was still ruling the globe as colonial powers, and so it should be far from surprising that European 
powers omitted the Global South from refugee discourse all together. Then, looking outside of 
Europe, we are reminded that in the pursuit of victory, European powers not only excluded the 
Global South from refugee discourse but included them in their armies, many of whom would 
become refugees at the hands of their colonial masters as a result of the war.46  
Let us look the example of Africa, which at the time was almost entirely under colonial 
rule and the site for colonial proxy wars. In East Africa alone, one million Africans died when 
English and French troops attempted to seize the four German colonies in Africa (German East 
Africa, German South-West Africa, Togoland and Cameroon).47 Fighting was particularly brutal 
in German East Africa where German General Lettow-Vorbeck adopted a guerilla strategy, 
drawing more and more territory into warfare. In the colonial administrative area of Dodoma in 
German East Africa, which today is Tanzania, there was a 20% population loss between the years 
1917-1918.48 I have little doubt that people were fleeing the guerrilla warfare that was ravishing 
the region, and yet the League of Nations failed to even discuss this matter or that those fleeing 
may qualify as refugees. As colonies, the principle of sovereignty did not apply to them, and, from 
the colonial perspective, African identities were clumped together, making the prospect of a 
nation-state for which refugees enter and exit conceptually impossible. 
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In exploring the first example of multilateral cooperation on the matter of refugees, we see 
that the emerging definition of the refugee’s scope and obligation are formed according to the 
interests of the most powerful states, who in this period of history were represented in the League 
of Nations. Unwilling to adopt future obligations to refugee protection, states within the League 
of Nations granted refugee status to specific nationalities based on if they represented a political 
gain for their stability and image. However, for those who were not politically salient or would 
have been a political embarrassment such as the Italians, Spanish, or East Africans, the League did 
not bother to offer any of them protection for the persecution and violence from which they fled. 
As such, we see how the strongest states within the international system are able to form a 
dominant frame on the scope and obligation of the refugee in line with their state interests.  
IV. World War II: The creation of a Eurocentric refugee regime  
While the interwar period could be characterized as a haphazard construction of the 
refugee’s scope and obligation by political elites in the League of Nations, the period following 
World War II is when the world sees its first international, universal, and legal definition of the 
refugee. As we will see, however, this decontested definition does not apply evenly to everyone as 
it has an explicit and implicit Eurocentric frame. In this section, we will see how the Suasion Game 
plays out in practice when the political dominance of European states results in their political 
discourse having significant framing effects on forming the international refugee regime.  
It was in the aftermath of World War II that the international refugee regime was created 
within the United Nations. The refugee regime, as any international regime, is defined by implicit 
and explicit "principles, norms, roles and decision-making procedures" around which the 
expectations of actors converge in a given area of international relations.49 Regimes emerge to 
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facilitate international cooperation among states and to regulate their behavior in a specific issue 
area, and they fulfill this role by, for example, establishing common standards of behavior and 
compliance by providing information and surveillance of participating states, often organized 
within an international institution. In the case of the refugee regime, the principles, norms, and 
roles of asylum are enshrined in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which has been signed by 156 countries and serves as the foundation to nearly all refugee policy 
around the world. The institution that attempts to regulate state behavior on matters of asylum and 
provide information and surveillance to participating states is the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner to Refugees (UNHCR). As will be explored in this section, the creation of the 
refugee regime did not come without political manipulation that suited the interests of the 
dominant state actors at the time, represented predominantly by Western European states. 
Following much of the same ad hoc nature of the League of Nations, the creation of the 
refugee regime was driven by the geopolitical interests of the victors of the Second World War, 
and they were housed within the United Nations. However, the failure of the League of Nations 
left participating states reluctant to grant any significant power to another intergovernmental 
organization such as the UN, especially on a topic such as refugee that would result in real political 
consequences on the Contracting States. This attitude resulted in a succession of bodies which 
were temporary measures aimed at solving an emergency situation, but none of which succeeded 
in providing any long-standing definition of the refugee or defining the scope or obligation that 
refugee status implies.50 The first of these failed organizations was the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), whose principle function was to oversee and promote 
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the repatriation of the millions of displaced persons under Allied control.51 Hardly a refugee 
organization, UNRRA did not have the authority to grant protection to displaced persons, and if 
anything, it did quite the opposite. UNRRA behaved according to dominant state interests, which 
at the time prioritized their stability over finding a humanitarian solution to the humanitarian 
problem of refugees. As such, under Soviet pressure, it aided in the forced repatriation of a large 
number of people, many of whom asserted fear of persecution on their return home.52  
We can begin to see how state interests take priority in forming refugee policy, and the 
Cold War marked another stage in the history of refugee cooperation that had more to do with 
geopolitical gains than humanitarian involvement. The contemporary refugee is considered to 
emerge fully only after the abolition of the UNRRA in 1945. In line with the division of the Iron 
Curtain, Western European states undertook new initiatives to resettle Eastern European refugees, 
despite strong opposition from the Soviet Union. In order to help their resettlement scheme, the 
Allied states formed the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1947, where we see the first 
international definition of a refugee’s scope as based on “persecution, or fear of persecution” on 
the grounds of race, religion, nationalities, or political opinion.53  
However, this legal definition was not created solely with the refugee in mind; rather, it 
created a narrow enough scope in refugee status that would fit to Europeans fleeing persecution, 
but would fit less neatly to non-Europeans in the Global South who were fleeing mostly 
indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, by creating an international legal norm to refugee status, it 
expanded the obligation for refugee protection to the international community, thereby 
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externalizing the European refugee crisis. As Gil Loescher explains, “Western powers hoped the 
that IRO would achieve two goals: First, to resolve effectively situations either potential to 
destabilize already-weakened European economies attempting to recover from the ruins of war, 
and second, to ‘internationalize’ the refugee problem by distributing refugees and refugee costs 
among a number of North and South American and Western European Nations, as well as 
Australasia and a number of African countries.”54 The IRO’s raison d’être indicates the 
development towards an international refugee regime that was structured to suit Western European 
interests in maintaining their stability and image.  
Once the IRO proved to be too expensive and inefficient of an institution, states were no 
longer willing to fund its programs and it was gradually phased out without any other body charged 
with the responsibility of managing refugee flows. With new conflicts in Palestine, Korea, India 
and China generating new waves of refugees by the millions, Western states were unwilling to 
pledge themselves to a generalized support of refugees and thereby opposed the United Nations to 
take on unspecified and future responsibilities in refugee cooperation.55 As such, the establishment 
of United Nations Office to the High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 reflected the 
political interests of European powers who placed tight restrictions on its function and scope and 
allowed it very little autonomy in organizing refugee protection and no authority in granting 
refugee status.56  
However, the end of World War II began a brand new approach to international cooperation 
on refugee protection. With refugees moving by the millions across the continent, European states 
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were compelled to find a more concrete solution to refugee flows. Now, with the interest of 
European states leading at the forefront, the refugee regime was created with the 1951Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which today represents the most important legal base for the 
right to asylum around the world. Once again, we see how dominant state powers are able to 
reframe the scope and obligation of the refugee according to their interests. In this case, once 
refugee flows were affecting European significantly and directly, European state actors pushed for 
international cooperation to manage refugee flows.  
However, despite its global dimension, it was far from universal in scope. In the Travaux 
Preparatoires – the official record of the negotiations – there is a clear indication of European 
dominance in both presence and rhetoric. The conference, held in Geneva, appeared to be nothing 
more than a “slightly enlarged” meeting of the Council of Europe,57 as only a fraction of the 41 
governments who voted for Article 1 in the General Assembly were willing to come to Geneva to 
sign the document. Those who did, however, were mostly European; of the 19 signatories, just 
three represented non-European states (Israel, Colombia, and Turkey).58 
During deliberations, Western states “remained concerned that ‘too vague a definition’ 
would entail unknowable (and excessive) responsibilities, and provoke disagreements between 
governments with respect to its interpretation and application.”59 European states were interested 
in forming a refugee regime that would neither threaten their sovereignty nor impose future 
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financial or legal responsibilities.60 As a result, the definition of a refugee was laden with 
conditions. Under Article 1 (A), the term ‘refugee’ will apply to any person who:  
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.61 
 
In Article 1 (B), this temporal element is further explained by giving a geographic limitation:  
For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events occurring before 1 January 
1951” in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either: 
(a) events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951; or 
(b) events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 195162 
 
The decision on whether to keep the geographic limitation during the signing of the 
Convention was up to the individual signatory, but as Representative to France Mr. Rochefort 
noted, those who argued for the deletion of the geographical limitation “had done so without any 
feeling of definite responsibility.”63 With little to no voice in the process, countries of the Global 
South signed on to the Convention despite its Eurocentric limitations, exemplifying how power 
within the international system helped drive European interests to define the refugee’s scope and 
obligation.  
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In this section, we see how power determines which state interests are weaved into the 
dominant frame of the refugee’s scope and obligation. Through the creation of the refugee regime, 
Europeans were able to maintain their interests, omitting any person who was not European and 
maintaining a deliberately narrow obligation for protection. However, due to the international 
scope of the 1951 Convention’s signing, this definition continues to be base for all refugee policy 
today, making the political nuances of its creation all the more important to understand. As we will 
see in Chapter 4, the Eurocentrism in the Convection’s definition will come back up to shape the 
scope of refugee status in Turkey, and in the next section, we will look at how this Convention 
was expanded to form a legally universal definition, but that in practice, the refugee regime still 
functions as a product of state interests.  
V. After the 1951 Convention: the ‘half complete’ refugee regime  
It was not until sixteen years later that the 1951 Convention was amended to delete the 
geographic and temporal limitations of the original Convention in the establishment of the 1967 
Protocol Amending the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Up until this point, 
UNHCR used its “good offices” to make ad hoc decisions to grant refugee status beyond that 
which was in its mandate or defined by the 1951 Convention.64 The lack of a consistent doctrinal 
definition of the refugee allowed for the selective picking of groups and individuals that suited the 
geopolitics of Europe, particularly during the Cold War. Asylum seekers were “voting with their 
feet,”65 and Western states were quick to grant refugee status to nationalities that would give them 
some sort of political advantage. During the Hungarian Revolution, for example, UNHCR made 
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no attempt to judge individual motives for Hungarians flight but instead approved all Hungarians 
in Austria and Yugoslavia as prima facie refugees.66  
However, this was not the case in less Europeanized conflicts, such as the mass exodus 
which occurred between 1975-95 in Southeast Asia, where over a half-million people fled from 
Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam.67 From official documents, we can see that UNHCR appeared to 
be much more reluctant to apply the term “refugee” to those it assisted, and the papers instead 
referred to “displaced persons.” 68 This reflected the reluctance of those within the Executive 
Committee to apply refugee status to large numbers of people, fearing that this would create an 
undesired obligation upon the Contracting States in the General Assembly.69 Thus, in 1977, the 
Executive Committee to UNHCR began using the term “asylum-seeker” for the first time as a 
medium between the legal granting of refugee status and the migrant who might qualify but has 
yet to enjoy those protections and rights. In this example, we see how power continues to influence 
the framing on the scope and obligation of the refugee, albeit more discretely. Since the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol defined the scope for refugee status as individualized and based 
on persecution, it was difficult for UNHCR to work within its Statute and apply refugee status to 
large groups of people who were mostly fleeing indiscriminate violence. As such, the High 
Commissioner’s Office created another term to describe those stuck in limbo as their request for 
protection was being processed.  
But now, with the end of the Cold War and the abolition of the Eurocentric limitations in 
the 1951 Convention, what does the refugee regime look like today? Betts describes this regime 
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as “half-complete,”70 because while it attempts to decontest the refugee’s scope as being universal, 
it does not go so far as to indicate the obligation that the refugee poses on the state. Included in the 
1951 Convention is the principle of non-refoulement, which states that a state cannot send back a 
migrant if they fear for their life or safety.71 Unsurprisingly, a definition as ambiguous as this 
allows for a significant amount of variation in how states decontest the appropriate refugee 
protection. Relating to the Suasion Game, states cooperate on refugee protection because it is a 
regional public good; however, because power is uneven, the strongest state will always succeed 
in defining the obligation of the refugee, whereas the weaker state must always concede to this 
definition.  
For example, in the contemporary example of the European Union and Turkey, they are 
currently in negotiations to find a solution to the refugee crisis. The EU as the stronger actor will 
grant Turkey some concessions (such as an unlikely promise for future accession and a large sum 
of money), but in return, it will get all of interests (for Turkey to readmit migrants that passed 
through its territory in order to effectively stem migration into Europe). Turkey, on the other hand, 
will have wanted more from this exchange – the opening of Chapters for its accession, for example, 
or the creation of a safe zone within Northern Syria to which it could send its Syrian refugees. 
However, Turkey will lose even more if it defects in cooperation with the EU, because the EU has 
the dominant strategy as the stronger state. As such, Turkey will cooperate and concede to the 
EU’s terms of negotiations and in turn, this cooperation will shape the obligation for refugee status 
as the Suasion Game suggests. This will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter, but it 
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provides an example of how the ‘half-complete’ regime today requires the Suasion Game to define 
the terms for protection in refugee politics.  
VI. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have shown how the refugee, as an essentially contested concept, has been 
decontested in various periods in history in which a dominant frame of its scope and obligation 
was formed. As I showed in my analysis of the refugee’s history, this frame is formed according 
to state interests in stability and image, and this will shape refugee policy in line with state 
preferences regardless of if they are beneficial for the refugees or not. Furthermore, I explore how 
power between states determines which frame becomes dominant; or in other words, the strongest 
state will be able to form the dominant frame on the refugee, which will have significant framing 
effects on public opinion and refugee policy. Finally, what explains a shift in the frame over time 
is due to a change in refugee movements that will affect a powerful state, who will then decontest 
the refugee’s scope and obligation in order to reframe it in a way that aligns to new state interests.  
In its origins, the refugee implied no obligation to the state who maintained a strict ban on 
emigration, defining the refugee as an internally displaced person. Once emigration was no longer 
restricted and refugee flows affected neighboring countries, the dominants states, represented in 
the League of Nations, reframed the definition of the refugee to suit their shifting interests in the 
aftermath of World War I. Here we see the refugee’s scope was determined by the person’s 
political value to the receiving state, highly politicizing the concept of “refugee.” Following the 
wake of World War II, the refugee gained its first universal, legal definition through the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, where the refugee was defined through implicit 
and explicit Eurocentric frames due to the dominance of European discourse. Following the end 
of the Cold War and the 1967 Protocol, we see a wider scope to the refugee’s definition but an 
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ambiguous and constantly shifting obligation, which can be modeled through the Suasion Game. 
In each piece of history analyzed, we can see how the refugee’s scope and obligation are products 
of state interests and state power. Now, with an understanding of the historical background and a 
toolbox for how to analyze the concept of “refugee,” In Chapter 4 I will in show how the EU is 
presently reframing the refugee in line with its state interests through cooperation with Turkey.  
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Chapter 4: Reframing the refugee through Turkish-EU cooperation 
I. Introduction 
Over the past five years, there has been a gradual awakening in Europe to refugee flows as 
they drew closer and, like a glass overflowing, poured into EU borders. Along with this awakening 
came a shift in the framing of the concept of “refugee.” From what was previously considered 
sparse irregular migration into the EU, to a “migration crisis,” and now to the “refugee crisis” that 
is making headlines each day, the concept of “refugee” has shifted due to its changing patterns and 
the state interests that respond to these shifts. Indeed, even after the 1951 Convention, its 1967 
Protocol, and the numerous asylum policies that have sprung up regionally and nationally since, 
the refugee’s scope and obligation are no less contested than they have been throughout their 
history. In this chapter, we will see how the EU decontests the concept of “refugee” through its 
cooperation with Turkey on migration and asylum policies, and how this new frame is structured 
to suit its interests.72  
First, we will see how the concept of “refugee” remains contested by looking at the shift from 
what was called a “migration crisis” to what is now called a  “refugee crisis,” and how terms such 
as “migrant” and “refugee” are used inconsistently in political discourse. Next, we will look at 
how interests in stability and image have driven the EU to cooperate with Turkey on migration, 
thereby externalizing its migration problem in the pursuit of stability, while maintaining a positive 
humanitarian image through its rhetoric. We can see how these interests play out by using 
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must act in moderation and maintain approval from its Member States because it is they who give, and who can 
take away, its legitimacy as an institution. For the purposes of this thesis, I will treat the European Union as a state-
like actor with interests in decontesting the concept of “refugee” that it pursues through its discourse.   
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securitized or humanitarian rhetoric, and most importantly, how this rhetoric is reframing our 
understanding of the refugee’s scope and obligation.      
From a “migration crisis” to a “refugee crisis”: the decontestation of migration in Europe  
The “migration crisis” came crashing into the European agenda in 2013 after a boat filled 
with mostly Eritreans departing from Libya capsized off the Italian island of Lampedusa, killing 
366 of the 500 passengers on board. While irregular migration had been affecting Italy for the last 
decade, it did not rise front-and-center on the European agenda until it posed a humanitarian crisis 
too big for the international community to ignore. This event sparked outcry around the world and 
caused the citizens of the European Union to reconsider their responsibility for those seeking 
protection on their territory. As EU Commissioner Cecilia Malstom commented, “the tragedy in 
Lampedusa triggered a very wide and emotional reaction across Europe - a chorus of voices calling 
for actions to avoid such disasters in the future.”73 As if to prophesize the situation today, Dalia 
Girybauskaite, President of Lithuania and EU Council President at the time, admitted after the 
tragedy that, "Today, Europe is not ready to accept as many refugees as probably can flow in."74 
But for whom Girybauskaite might have referred to as “refugees,” most European media 
outlets and political elites were still categorizing as “migrants;”75 the difference being in the 
                                                          
73 The European Union, European Commission, "Lampedusa Follow Up: Concrete Actions to Prevent Loss of Life in 
the Mediterranean and Better Address Migratory and Asylum Flows," press release, 4 December 2013, accessed 
March 22, 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1199_en.htm.  
74 Adrian Croft and Justnya Pawlak, “EU leaders rebuff calls for action on Europe's migration crisis,” Reuters, 25 
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75 Examples include: Ian Traynor and Tom Kington, “EU pressed to rethink immigration policy after Lampedusa 
tragedy,” the Guardian, 8 October 2013, accessed March 10 2016, 
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296_en.htm; Andrew Harding, “Italy boat sinking: Hundreds feared dead off Lampedusa,” BBC, 3 October 2013, 
accessed December 11, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24380247. 
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obligation that these titles entail. As such, the Eritrean “boat people”76 who fell victim to their 
capsized ship were seen as a “headache for struggling Italy,”77 and did not impose anything more 
than a moral obligation to curb their tragic deaths at sea. This is despite the fact that the boat’s 500 
passengers were nearly all Eritrean, a population that represented 22% of asylum-seekers in Italy 
in 201378 and constituted 14,485 asylum applications to the whole of the EU that same year.79 If 
nearly one-fourth of all refugees in Italy originated from the same state as those who died off the 
coast of Lampedusa, why, then, were they coined as “migrants” as opposed to the asylum-seekers 
they likely were?  
As I will argue in this chapter, a change in attributing particular persons or nationalities to 
the status of “refugee” does not come without political intention. Much as was the case following 
World War I and World War II, international cooperation on refugee flows begins to take the 
greatest momentum when powerful states become greatly affected. Though it is not Europeans 
who are the refugees this time, the increased numbers entering EU borders has forced the EU to 
find a new approach to managing immigration, and they have done so by redefining the refugee’s 
cause and obligation through its political discourse.  
To quickly give an idea of the scope of the “refugee crisis” which has unfolded in Europe, 
by 2014 there were 283,000 irregular border crossings detected80 and 625,920 first-instance 
                                                          
76 Nicholas Farrell, “Welcome to Italy: this is what a real immigration crisis looks like,” the Spectator, 20 June 2015, 
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asylum applications submitted to the EU,81 resulting in a 50% increase in applications and a 165% 
increase in illegal border crossing compared to the year before. By 2015, detected irregular border 
crossings reached 1.5 million,82 and asylum applications were not far behind at 942,400.83  These 
astonishing figures have done more than to overwhelm the administrations of EU Member States; 
they have caused the EU to readjust the ways in which it has conceptualized and dealt with 
migration in the past. As we will see in this chapter, through cooperation with Turkey, the EU will 
not only change its response to refugee movements but it will reframe who a refugee is, and what 
this status obliges upon the receiving state. At the State of the Union address in September 2015, 
Commission President Junker emphasized the urgency to solve the refugee crisis in Europe by 
stating that, “it is high time to act to manage the refugee crisis. There is no alternative.”84 In this 
chapter, I will show how the EU is reframing the concept of “refugee” in accordance to its interests 
in stability and image through cooperation with Turkey.  
II. EU and Turkish state interests: Image and stability   
As explained in Chapter 2, I identify two driving interests that lead to shifts in refugee framing: 
stability and image. In this section, I will show how these interests converge between the EU and 
Turkey, and how this explains their recent cooperation on migration policy. The EU’s interest in 
stabilizing the refugee crisis has pushed it to create externalization policies with Turkey, which in 
return has satisfied Turkish interests in economic stability. Despite the EU’s priority to “stem the 
flows,”85 the EU is aware of its image and uses humanitarian framing to find a moderate path 
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between securitization policies and humanitarian relief. Also concerned with its image, Turkey 
uses cooperation with the EU to send a message to the actors who are presently challenging its 
security and legitimacy that it has a strong European alliance. In the section, I will show how EU-
Turkish cooperation in controlling migration has satisfied their interests in stability and image.   
In 2015, immigration was seen as the major challenge facing the European Union, polling 
higher than economic issues or unemployment, which were all ranked as more concerning than 
was migration just one year before.86 It remains the number one most frequently cited concern 
among 20 Member States, 87 and this concern has resulted in concrete action within the EU to find 
a solution. As Member State pass national legislation to limit the rights and movement of those 
seeking protection,88 others reinstate border controls under indefinite state of emergencies,89 and 
other Member States produce propaganda domestically and abroad to deter immigration into their 
state,90 the break-up of the Schengen Area and the European project have become very serious 
concerns for the future of the EU. As such, the effects of the “refugee crisis” and the EU’s response 
should not be underestimated. The EU is facing a very real challenge on its stability as a 
supranational institution, and its behavior can be explained through its attempt to regain control. 
These threats to EU stability range from security concerns focused on the EU’s external borders 
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where states are unable to administratively register and account for all those entering, as well as 
budgetary concerns on how to fund long-term integration into EU Member States for those who 
are granted refugee status. In a region where freedom of movement is the paradigm to regional 
integration, this threat to intra-EU migration challenges the stability of the European Union as a 
legitimate institution.  
While some Member States have chosen to respond to the influx of immigration by erecting 
barriers, closing borders, and spouting security concerns over humanitarian relief, the European 
Union is not a position to endorse such a dramatic stance. As a supranational institution, it has far 
less autonomy in decision-making than would a state, and requires approval from a variety of 
levels: its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches; its Member State governments; and its 
citizenry. For the purposes of this thesis, I will simplify the complexity of stakeholders that make 
up the European Union and its legislative body, because in regards to asylum policy, the EU has a 
wide range of competences that allow it to form policy without the approval of its 
intergovernmental branch or its citizenry.  
 Nonetheless, the EU is aware of its image, and as a unique body that is constantly trying to 
prove its legitimacy within an international system that values states over institutions, it steps 
carefully when drafting policy so as to maintain a balance between its own interests as a 
supranational institution and the interests of its Member States that structure it. In other words, the 
EU could never respond to the refugee crisis by erecting a fence as did Hungary, nor could it 
declare an open-border policy as did Germany. Instead, the EU must find a middle ground that is 
relatively moderate and work as a negotiator between conflicting interests within its organization. 
The EU, perhaps more than a governmental body is regarded as a bureaucratic machine, and to 
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understand the significance of its policy output, interests, and political intention requires one to 
sift through the diplomatic clout that makes up its publications, speeches, and press releases.   
This being said, the EU is not politically bereft – a puppet for the interests of states, as we 
consider most international organizations. Rather, I would argue that behind the diplomatic speech 
and well-trained bureaucrats lies an innovative and strategic body who is able to streamline its 
interests despite its restrictive scope and mandate. It is exactly this expectation that the EU is more 
of a diplomatic institution than a politicized one that makes an analysis of its underlying interests 
and policy goals all the more important to devolve. Indeed, when the EU frames its cooperation 
with Turkey as being humanitarian-driven but acts by participating in controversial externalization 
policies that does not require oversight by the public or its branches, its important to reconsider 
how politically neutral the EU really is.  
While the EU has limited capacity to force its Member States to concede quickly and 
correctly to European asylum legislation, it has been very efficient in negotiating quick agreements 
with third countries91 on migration outside of Europe. Scholars refer to these negotiations as 
externalization policies,92 which generally consist of controversial packages that appear under the 
purview of humanitarian concern but are aimed at restricting migratory flows and keeping them 
and their consequences outside of EU territory. The externalization agenda is based on three 
overlapping concepts, but for the purposes of this thesis I will focus on two: safe third-country and 
capacity building.  
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The “safe third-country” concept allows asylum seekers to be readmitted to supposedly 
safe non-EU states through which they pass.93 Those returned to allegedly safe countries are often 
subject to further deportations to countries with less capacity to adjudicate their claims fairly or 
meet their basic needs. A number of EU member states have implemented the “safe third country” 
policy for some time, based on a network of bilateral and multilateral readmission agreements and 
most of which contain few safeguards for asylum seekers.94 
The next concept is “capacity building,” which utilizes development aid to create sufficient 
protection conditions in a third country so that EU states may conclude readmission agreements 
with that government.95 For the convenience of EU Member States, asylum seekers could then be 
returned to countries that meet their minimal protection needs. While the EU claims a humanitarian 
purpose by declaring that it will prevent migrants from taking a dangerous journey with smugglers 
into Europe, in practice, it has not served as a deterrent and in fact, the bulk of the capacity-building 
assistance has gone to strengthening border controls and immigration enforcement instead of 
increasing protection standards.96 
In the context of the present day refugee crisis, the EU has identified a variety of partners with 
which to negotiate these controversial migration policy packages, and the partner who has made 
the most headlines recently has been Turkey. Turkey has been identified as a “strategic partner”97 
in stemming migration flows because of its relationship to migration and its relationship to the 
European Union. Since the onset of the Arab Spring, Turkey has become a top destination for 
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those fleeing conflict in the region, which now represents the main transit country through which 
migrants are irregularly entering the EU. With more than 350,000 people detected as irregularly 
entering EU territory from Turkey within just the first nine months of 2015,98 it is unsurprising 
that German Chancellor Angel Merkel noted that the European Union “cannot organise or stem 
the refugee movement without working with Turkey,”99 following her visit to Ankara in October 
2015.  
Additionally, the EU can also portray a humanitarian concern through negotiations with 
Turkey, spinning the controversial externalization policies as an effort to provide “capacity 
building” assistance and humanitarian relief to Turkish host communities and directly to the 
refugees found within Turkey. As I will explain further in the next section on rhetoric, the ability 
for the EU to frame its policies through a humanitarian lens allows it to find a moderate path 
between securitization policies and humanitarian relief, satisfying its need to maintain a positive 
image.  
 Of course, Turkey too has its own interests in stability and image that make it eager to 
cooperate with the EU. The Syrian civil war has put particular pressure on Turkey, who now hosts 
2.2 million Syrians,100 making it the country that hosts the largest refugee population in the world. 
Additionally, Turkey has spent over 7 billion euros to address its own migration crisis,101 and it is 
running short on funding to support registration, reception, and any form of integration for refugees 
                                                          
98 Janis A. Emmanouilidis, “Europe’s reactive and protective muddling through: the results of a summit in fire 
fighting mode,” European Policy Centre, 19 October 2015, accessed 21 November 2015, 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_6041_post-summit_analysis_-_19_october_2015.pdf. 
99 Ibid, 4. 
100 The European Union, European Commission, "Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey 
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in its territory. With the promise of a financial aid package of 3 billion euros (which is likely to 
increase) to ease Turkey’s economic burden and balance its economic stability concerns, 
cooperation with the EU is in Turkey’s interest.  
 Additionally, Turkey is also concerned about the image it projects to its domestic and 
international audiences, and this interest coalesces under the prospect of EU accession. In return 
for Turkish cooperation, the EU has pledged to re-energize accession negotiations in order to 
prepare for their “common future.”102 Turkey has been part of the European project since it came 
into existence in 1959, gaining special privileges as an associate member in 1970, and finally 
becoming a candidate country to the EU in 2005. However, one of the major impediments to 
Turkish accession into the EU has been its poor record of democratization and human rights. 
Accession negotiations provide an excellent track for Turkey to align with EU policies and to meet 
“European standards,”103 and the EU considers itself an “an important anchor for Turkey’s 
economic and political reforms,”104 and a way to modernize the Turkish democracy. As the 
Turkish Minister for European Affairs, Egemen Bağiş, stated in an interview, “I consider EU to 
be the Turkish dietician. Everyone knows that he has to pay attention to what he eats and needs 
regular exercise. But people sometimes need a good prescription to know what to do. The EU’s 
prescription is its communitarian acquis: implementing the EU rules and regulations, and making 
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them a part of the integration process, helps you become a better country for our own children. 
That’s what we are committed to do and that is what we will continue to do.”105  
 Furthermore, closer cooperation with the EU would send a message that the Turkish state 
has a strong alliance to be reckoned with to those who are currently contesting Turkish legitimacy. 
Indeed, in an increasingly volatile region, Turkey is faced with armed conflict from Kurdish 
factions, challenged and attacked by ISIS, and has cut off relations with Russia and the Assad 
regime, requiring Turkey to step carefully when choosing its allies in order to ensure its national 
security. As such, the prospect of accession helps Turkey send a message of stability to both its 
domestic audience and to those within the international community who are challenging its power.   
 Whereas the prospect of accession and securing state stability have drawn Turkey into 
negotiations with the EU, the EU’s ability to pursue externalization policies that will help stabilize 
the refugee crisis in Europe are the driving forces to its cooperation with Turkey. By spinning these 
externalization policies as being humanitarian-driven, the EU can maintain a positive and moderate 
image to its public and to its stakeholders which construct the legitimacy of the institution. In the 
next section, we will see how these interests are portrayed in political discourse, and how this will 
have significant framing effects on how the refugee’s scope and obligation are conceptualized in 
Europe today.   
III. Securitized and humanitarian rhetoric: A balance between state interests 
 In this section, we will see how the EU and Turkey’s interests in stability and image play 
out through the political discourse of their cooperation. More specifically, we will see how a 
concern for state stability will generally result in securitized framing, whereas a concern for state 
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image will generally result in humanitarian framing. As we will see in this section, the EU and 
Turkey are careful to pick the categories and frames that best suit their interests in decontesting 
the concepts of migration, and this will result in a reframing of the refugee’s scope and obligation.    
 How do state interests play out in the rhetoric of asylum? As I have argued in this thesis, 
states have two predominant interests when it comes to refugee concerns: state stability, and state 
image. Whether or not refugees pose a threat to state stability depends on their the movement; as 
a regional public good, the states most interested in defining the concept of “refugee” will be those 
most affected, and they will also be most likely view its movements as a threat to their state’s 
stability. At the same time, states are concerned with the image they project to their domestic and 
international audiences, and will therefore step carefully in their word-choice on refugees and 
refugee policies, particularly when refugee flows are politically salient. Similarly, if refugee flows 
affect states directly, those states will be more likely to care about their image since their response 
will garner more attention from the public and the international community.  
 These interests are portrayed through two dominant rhetorical frames: the securitized frame 
and the humanitarian frame. The securitized frame tends to follow when a state places the greatest 
concern on state stability, emphasizing issues such as security, budget, or cultural and religious 
cohesion. The humanitarian frame, on the other hand, is invoked when states are concerned about 
their image, and so they might discuss the humanitarian impacts of refugee flows so as to appeal 
for greater burden-sharing among the international community, or to appear concerned and 
responsive to the humanitarian crisis for their public. States will navigate between these two frames 
in order to decontest the concept of “refugee” in a way that best suits their interests. As we will 
see in this section, EU-Turkish discourse on asylum has resulted in both a strong securitized 
framing as well as a strong humanitarian framing. As such, I will argue that these succeed in 
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portraying the EU and Turkey as positively concerned with humanitarianism in their negotiations, 
while successfully stemming migratory flows into the EU and side-stepping their humanitarian 
responsibility in order to achieve their interest in stability. 
Securitized Framing: Certainly, the driving force to EU-Turkish cooperation is their joint interest 
in stability, and this becomes clear through the securitized framing of their rhetoric about refugees. 
Consider the section headed, “cooperating with third countries to stem to flows”106 from the EU 
Council Conclusion in October 2015. In the invitation letter to the summit where this document 
had been drafted, Donald Tusk, President of the EU Council wrote to Member States that the goal 
of his “talks in Ankara was to stem the wave of refugees to Europe,”107 clearly emphasizing 
security concerns. Similarly, written remarks sent after the Europe Council highlight that 
discussion with Turkey “were devoted to one goal: stemming the migratory flows.”108 Indeed, in 
all official documents relating to cooperation with Turkey, they underline a need “prevent irregular 
migration,”109 or sometimes put in a more securitized rhetoric, they are “determined to strengthen 
their co-operation in order to combat illegal immigration,”110 as if ‘illegal’ immigration were 
something that ought to be ‘combatted.’  
Humanitarian framing: On the other hand, the EU and Turkey are interested in maintaining a 
positive image within the international community and among their domestic audiences in regards 
to refugees, which often contradicts their interest in state stability. As such, they will invoke the 
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humanitarian frame in their discourse in order to balance their security-oriented goals while 
maintaining public and international support. Take, for example, the rhetoric used when 
introducing the Joint Action Plan with Turkey in October 2015, which granted Turkey 3 billion 
euros to provide “immediate humanitarian, development and other assistance to refugees.”111 In 
their press release, the EU and Turkey declared that “human dignity is at the core of our common 
endeavour,”112 and emphasized that “priority will be given to actions providing immediate 
humanitarian assistance; provision of legal, administrative, and psychological support; support for 
community centres; the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in economy and their 
social inclusion during their stay in Turkey; improved access to education at all levels”113 and so 
on. In all of these quotes, there is a clear emphasis on the human dimension of asylum politics and 
a dedication to humanitarianism over other concerns.   
IV. The framing effect of rhetoric on the refugee’s scope and obligation  
What, then, is the effect of securitized and humanitarian framing on refugee policies? As I 
have argued in this thesis, rhetoric is not merely talk, and actions are not separate from speech, but 
rather, speech is action. Political discourse has significant framing effects on shaping our world 
view from which policies evolve, so the way state actors decontest a concept is an action to change 
the way we understand its meaning. As for the refugee, I will show how the interplay between 
securitized and humanitarian framing through EU-Turkish cooperation has reshaped how we 
perceive the cause and the obligation of the refugee, resulting in real policy implications on 
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asylum. Furthermore, I will explain how this shifted obligation is of greatest benefit to the 
European Union, and how their cooperation exemplifies a real-world example of the Suasion 
Game, where the stronger actor will always set the rules for cooperation and the weaker actor will 
always need to concede to the stronger actor’s requests. 
Narrowed scope: Syrian exceptionalism  
As I have discussed in this thesis, the scope for refugee status is essentially contested, and 
state actors have an interest in decontesting its definition so as to narrow or widen the number of 
people who can qualify for this status. For example, a state which is experiencing an influx of 
refugees may wish to narrow its scope so as to reduce the number of persons who could potentially 
claim this status. So how is EU-Turkish cooperation redefining the refugee’s scope? In this section, 
I will show how, through cooperation with Turkey, the EU has managed to narrow the frame for 
the scope of refugee status as being Syrian. I will argue that the EU has embraced Turkey’s tiered 
asylum system that creates a Syrian exceptionalism, forming a façade of humanitarian concern for 
Syrian refugees that negatively impacts non-Syrians and Syrians alike.  
I begin the story of the refugee’s shifting scope with a focus on Turkey’s unique asylum 
system. Rounding up to just its second anniversary, the Turkish national asylum system is young 
and still in transition. In April 2014, Turkey developed its asylum system under the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection, in which the Director General of Migration Management 
had become the sole institution responsible for asylum matters. Prior to this, UNHCR was in 
charge of processing asylum applications and granting refugee status, but due to an overwhelming 
number of asylum-seekers, UNHCR appealed to the Turkish government to create its own 
domestic system. With its recently acquired role of managing refugee matters, the Turkish asylum 
system has some very unique and controversial qualities.  
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 The most significant shortcoming of the Turkish asylum system is that it has still not 
removed the geographic limitations set in 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. To 
recall, the original documents allowed states to opt for providing protection to “persons originating 
from Europe” or to extend that to “persons originating from Europe and elsewhere”.114 As the only 
remaining member of the Council of Europe to maintain the geographic limitation to Europe, 
Turkey has no international legal obligation to provide protection to any non-European. In other 
words, persons who fall within the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee who come from a 
“European country of origin” qualify for “refugee” status under the Law on Foreigners and 
International protection (LFIP), Turkey’s legal asylum system. This “refugee” status under LFIP 
affords rights and entitlements in accordance with the requirements of the 1951 Convention, 
including the prospect of long-term legal integration in Turkey. Long-term integration includes 
access to education, access to the job market and access to health care.115 
This is in contrast to “conditional refugee” status, a Turkish legal concept for the purpose 
of differentiating treatment between 1951 Convention-type refugees originating from “non-
European” states and those originating from “European” states. “Conditional” refugee status 
confers a lesser amount of rights than does “refugee” status, and excludes the possibility for long-
term integration into Turkish society. In line with this status, “conditional refugees” are not 
afforded the right to education, work, or health care, and the allotment of such services are based 
on the discretion of the authorities. 
                                                          
114 United Nations, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
115 AIDA Information Database, “Common asylum system at a turning point: Refugees caught in Europe’s solidarity 
crisis,” European Council for Refugees and Exiles, Annual Report 2014-2015, accessed 14 November 2015, 
http://www.epim.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/aida_annualreport_2014-2015_0.pdf.   
66 
 
Despite the exclusionary consequence of this, the EU was careful not to criticize it. In the 
2015 Progress Report – an annual document which analyzes Turkey’s progress in aligning with 
EU policies and norms in the aim of future accession – the Commission only brushed over it in the 
opening of its “Asylum” chapter on Turkey by stating that, “All the provisions of the Law on 
Foreigners and International protection entered into force in April 2014. The law established an 
asylum system largely in line with the EU acquis, although Turkey continues to implement the 
1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees with a geographical limitation which limits its obligations 
only to refugees originating in Europe.”116 Without further mention, this sentence would lead us 
to believe that the LFIP is mostly up to par, except for one minor setback. Instead, this setback 
means that no non-European can qualify for full refuge status, rendering the whole system 
incomplete. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that any system that excludes non-Europeans could be 
“largely in line with the EU acquis,” which itself does not include any definition of a refugee’s 
scope based upon nationality or country of origin.  
Whereas the influx of European refugees in Turkey are very few, those coming from 
elsewhere in the world have increased at an exponential rate since the Arab Spring. The Syrian 
civil war has put particular pressure on Turkey, and to address the influx of Syrians, Turkey has 
added another tier to its asylum system.  In an emergency protocol, Turkey created a “temporary 
protection” status for those originating from Syria, where he or she is protected under a newly 
created Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) that grants beneficiaries the right to legal stay. 
The “temporary protection” status, which came into force 22 October 2014, is acquired on a prima 
facie, group-basis, to Syrian nationals and Stateless Palestinians originating from Syria. As of 7 
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December 2015, the number of refugees from Syria registered as beneficiaries of “temporary 
protection” was listed at 2,291,900, making Turkey the largest host country of Syrian refugees in 
the world.117 
However, there are several problems with this “temporary protection” status afforded to 
Syrians. First of all, it is exclusionary against non-Syrians, allowing any Syrian to enter Turkish 
borders without filing a claim, whereas other nationalities will be examined on a case-by-case, 
individualized basis and could wait years before being resettled.118 In fact, non-Syrian, non-
European asylum seekers can presently only be processed in Turkey for future resettlement in third 
countries or, as Syrians have been, granted temporary protection as an exercise of political 
discretion.119 In turn, this allows for very little safeguards for protection and appeal by non-Syrian, 
non-European refugees in Turkey.  
Despite the obvious problems with a tiered, nationality-based system such as Turkey’s, the 
European Union has responded with applause and embrace. Consider the priorities listed for how 
to confront the refugee crisis in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: “(a) by addressing the root 
causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) by supporting Syrians under temporary 
protection and their host communities in Turkey (Part I) and (c) by strengthening cooperation to 
prevent irregular migration flows to the EU (Part II).”120 In this statement, we see a humanitarian 
focus in Part I (a) and (b), but a security dilemma in Part II. Consequently, Part I refers to Syrians, 
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while Part II refers to “irregular migrants,” leading the reader to imagine that Syrians are more 
deserving of asylum whereas migrants of other nationalities pose a security threat to the state.  
While clearly deprioritizing non-Syrian, non-European asylum seekers, Turkey’s 
temporary protection scheme does not protect even Syrians in the ways we might assume.  This 
protection status does not afford any more rights than did the “conditional refugee” status, and in 
fact, this regulation excludes people under temporary protection from access to asylum procedures 
altogether.121 When under temporary protection, Syrian refugees located outside of camps do not 
have access to education, health care, work permits, or any other aids to integration unless under 
the discretion of authorities. This is significant because over 80% of refugees in Turkey are located 
outside of refugee camps.122  
However, most troubling is that this protection status is indeed temporary. The Temporary 
Protection Regulation is not primary law but was established as an emergency protocol, allowing 
the government to revoke it at any time. The possibility of reversing the temporary protection 
status becomes more worrisome when 86% of Turks believe that Turkey should not admit any 
more Syrian refugees,123 and President Erdoğan is calling for the creation of a “safe zone” 68 miles 
long and 40 miles deep on the Syrian side of the Turkish border that would constitute “the basis 
of 1.7 million Syrian refugees' return,"124 as he stated in a speech in September 2015.  
Despite these troubling factors to Syrian exceptionalism in Turkey, the EU has given 
Turkey its complete approval. In the Progress Report from 2015, the Commission noted that 
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Turkey “continued to provide unprecedented humanitarian aid and support to about 2.2 million 
refugees from Syria.”125 In an EU press release, the Commission gave its praise to Turkey by 
noting that it “is making commendable efforts to provide massive humanitarian aid and support to 
an unprecedented and continuously increasing influx of people seeking refuge from Syria,” and 
that the EU and Turkey will “step up their cooperation on support of Syrians under temporary 
protection and migration management in a coordinated effort to address the crisis created by the 
situation in Syria.”126 
With this kind of unabated support, the EU not only gives a justification of Syrian 
exceptionalism in Turkish policy, it endorsed it as its own. This focus on Syrians narrows the frame 
for the scope of refugee status by making the image of the refugee congruent with a Syrian refugee. 
In so doing, asylum policies prioritize Syrians over other refugees, which suits the EU’s interest 
in its image. By focusing on the humanitarian relief for Syrians, the EU draws on global sympathy 
to paint themselves as an altruistic power leading the humanitarian cause. In the State of the Union 
Address in September 2015, President of the Commission Jean Claude Junker stated that the “[the 
refugee crisis] is first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity… It is Europe today that 
represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability in the eyes of women and men in the Middle East 
and in Africa.”127 With the creation of a Syrian Trust Fund through the European Central Bank, a 
resettlement program for Syrian refugees, and a mobilization of 3.6 billion euros since the start of 
the Syrian crisis, the EU boasts that it is the “main world donor in addressing the consequences of 
this crisis.”128 Therefore, an endorsement of Turkey’s Syrian refugee policies and a silence to their 
                                                          
125 European Commission, “Turkey Progress Report: 2015,” 4.  
126 European Commission, "European Commission Fact Sheet: EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan." 
127Jean Claude Juncker, "State of the Union Address," 6.  
128 European Union, “Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the Coordination of the Actions of the Union 
and of the Member States through a Coordination Mechanism — the Refugee Facility for Turkey.” 
70 
 
shortcomings should not come as a surprise. Through cooperating with Turkey, the EU can appear 
concerned with the humanitarian crisis while at the same time keeping its effects at arms-length.  
But perhaps this Syrian exceptionalism exists because Syrians really are representing an 
exceptional case in refugee movements, and so the political response reflects this reality. Syria is 
the number one cause of global displacement with 9.5 million refugees or internally displaced 
persons resulting from the conflict.129 Additionally, Syrians represent 40% of irregular entries into 
the EU in 2014, and 26% of asylum applications to the EU in 2015 making them the largest 
population with both entries and applications. Similarly, Turkey hosts the largest population of 
Syrian refugees in the world at 2.2 million and the influx is putting a strain on host communities 
and the Turkish economy. As such, it would make sense that the EU and Turkey focus their 
cooperation and their attention on the Syrian conflict, which poses a major challenge to both blocs.  
While Syrians do constitute a large portion of global refugee movements, they are certainly 
not alone. In 2014, the world reached the highest number of refugees in recent history, with 60 
million refugees or persons in refugee-like situations, compared to 30.7 million persons a decade 
ago. Of the total global refugee population today, Syrians make up only 16%, and though 
significant, they represent only a small fraction of those in need of international protection. 
Similarly, Syrians represent only ¼ of the total asylum applications to the EU,130 with Afghans 
and Iraqis come in second and third.131 Indeed, both of these populations represent major refugee 
populations in the EU over the last decade due to circumstances very similar to those in Syria: civil 
war, anarchy, and violent militant organizations filling the power vacuum in their states. 
                                                          
129 David A. Graham, “Violence Has Forced 60 Million People From Their Homes,” The Atlantic, 15 June 2015, 
accessed 29 December 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/refugees-global-peace-
index/396122/.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Eurostat, "Countries of Origin of (non-EU) Asylum Seekers in the EU-28 Member States, 2013 and 2014 YB15 III." 
71 
 
Nevertheless, these populations remain in the shadows of refugee discourse as Syrians take a 
dominant position in our concept of “refugee,” even if Iraqis have a higher recognition rate for full 
refugee status than do Syrians.132  
This rhetorical framing has a much more significant impact than simply increasing the 
number of times “Syrian refugees” are referred to in the media or in press releases; it results in a 
prioritization of Syrians over other refugees. For example, in February 2016, countries located on 
the Balkan Route into Western Europe closed their borders to Afghan refugees, leaving Afghans 
stranded at the border of Greece and Macedonia while Syrians and Iraqis were free to pass. As one 
young Afghan refugee noted, “They informed us today that borders are closed to us and I wonder 
why. I don't know what to do. I can only wait. But why accept only the Syrians and the Iraqis and 
not us?"133 As we can see, the way that the refugee is framed in political discourse will have very 
tangible effects on the way we deal with refugees. In this case, a focus on Syrian refugees allowed 
the EU and its neighborhood to narrow the scope of refugee status down so as to cut off those that 
didn’t fit in the frame, such as Afghans.   
Narrowed obligation: Externalization policies and the Suasion Game 
Now that we have understood how the refugee’s scope has been reframed, what does EU-
Turkish discourse do to its obligation? Another way of thinking of the refugee’s obligation is to 
ask: what kind of protection must a state provide to someone deserving of refugee status? If we 
have already narrowed who is deserving of refugee status as being Syrian, then our next question 
is, what obligation must the EU provide to Syrian refugees?  
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By participating in externalization policies, the EU plays out the Suasion Game in deciding 
the outcomes of cooperation on refugee protection. As a reminder, the Suasion Game models a 
world in which cooperating actors have unequal interests and power, so that the equilibrium will 
always result in the stronger actor achieving its interest, and the weaker actor conceding to the 
stronger actor’s requests. The EU and Turkey have unequal interests in that the EU is eager to keep 
out refugee movements, whereas Turkey is most interested in receiving financial relief for the 
refugees it presently hosts within its borders and in creating a geopolitical alliance with the EU to 
help ensure its national security. This grants the EU a bargaining chip: in return for economic aid 
and the prospect of EU accession, Turkey must control those transiting through its country and 
prevent them from entering the EU’s external borders. In their cooperation on refugee obligation, 
the EU will achieve its top interest in “stemming the flows,”134 whereas Turkey must cooperate 
and take whatever the EU will provide in return: in this case, an unlikely promise for accession 
and a one-time donation to the Turkish state to help with their refugee crisis.  
Indeed, understanding how the Suasion Game works in practice exposes a dark side to 
cooperation between the EU and Turkey. By understanding how the obligation of refugee status is 
decontested through their cooperation, we can see how this new frame is formed according to state 
interest, and in particular, according to the strongest state’s interest. Behind a rhetoric of 
humanitarian concern which places exceptional emphasis on Syrians, the EU is actively 
externalizing its obligation so that it does not have any at all; keeping potential asylum-seekers 
from entering its borders and claiming any rights.  
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One of the ways that the EU has tried to pursue this is through claiming that Turkey is a 
“safe country of origin.” In September 2015, the Commission proposed a list of “safe countries of 
origin,” which would “allow for swifter processing of individual asylum applications from 
candidates originating from countries considered to be safe across the EU, and for faster returns if 
the individual assessments of the applications confirm no right of asylum.”135 In short, if Turkey 
is added to the safe country of origin list, migrants who transited through Turkey would be sent 
back to Turkey where they could apply for asylum there, and would therefore be barred from 
applying for asylum in the EU upon their arrival on EU territory. Creating a regulation to declare 
Turkey as a safe country for migrants would change the obligation of refugee status in two ways: 
1) it would say that Turkish asylum policies meet humanitarian standards and suffice for refugee 
protection and state obligation; and 2) it would take away the EU’s own obligation in providing 
refugee protection and put that obligation on the shoulders of Turkey.  
To address the first point, there are reasons for concern in calling Turkey a “safe” country. 
This decision to add Turkey to the list of safe countries comes despite a 23 percent approval rate 
for asylum applications from Turkish nationals in the EU in 2014,136 meaning that of Turkish 
citizens who apply for asylum in the EU, one in four are granted refugee status. This means that 
there are legitimate humanitarian concerns for declaring Turkey as “safe.” Moreover, in that same 
year, the European Court of Human Rights found 94 violations of human rights by Turkey.137  
If Turkey’s human rights record does not cause us to reconsider the safety of the country, 
its armed conflicts with political and ethnic factions should. Turkey has resumed an armed conflict 
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with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) after abandoning a peace process that many in Turkey 
welcomed after decades of fighting. As the hostilities are being played out in the towns and cities, 
the cost to civilians has been huge, with hundreds of deaths over a period of less than three months. 
On March 13, 2016, a suicide bomb went off in Ankara, killing 27 and wounding at least 75 others. 
The Kurdish Freedom Party – an offshoot of the PKK – claimed the blast and declared on their 
website that the militants struck "in the heart of (the) fascist Turkish republic."138 This is in addition 
to other terrorist attacks that have occurred on Turkish soil since the beginning of 2015, amounting 
to 11 in total. It is difficult to image how Turkey could qualify as a “safe country of origin” when 
its national security is becoming increasingly jeopardized. 
However, declaring Turkey as a safe country is perhaps the most explicit way that the EU 
is externalizing its migration problem. Indeed, the EU has been much more discrete, using the 
token of accession as leverage to get Turkey to reduce the number of migrants entering EU 
territory. An example of this is seen through the Roadmap to a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey. 
Visa liberalization between the EU and Turkey has been something that the Ankara government 
has been clamoring for since it became a candidate country in 2005, which would allow for Turkish 
nationals to travel within the Schengen Area visa-free for short-term touristic purposes. In 2012, 
Turkish Minister Egemen Bağış published an article criticizing the visa obligation on Turkish 
citizens, saying, “I hope common sense will prevail soon, and that the archaic and discriminatory 
visa regime will be discarded. That will only be one less brick on the wall, albeit an important 
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one.”139 Though discussions and negotiations for a visa free regime has been in the process for 
years, the agreement was only signed and put into force in December 2014.  
Matching the timeframe of its signing, the agreement is full of preconditions for reducing 
irregular migration to the EU from Turkish territory. The Roadmap to a Visa Free Regime was 
signed on the same day as the Readmission Agreement, an agreement that requires Turkey to 
readmit Turkish nationals and third-country nationals back to Turkey if they are found to be staying 
irregularly on EU territory. The fulfillment of the Readmission Agreement presents such a strong 
pre-condition to visa liberalization that the Commission writes that, “the pace of movement 
towards a visa liberalisation will depend on Turkey’s progress in adopting and implementing the 
measures and fulfilling the requirements set out in this Roadmap, including full and effective 
implementation of the readmission agreement.”140  
Included in these requirements is to no longer provide visas at the border for non-EU 
nationals “representing a high migratory and security risk to the EU”, and for the Turkish 
government to seek out and conclude readmission agreements with “countries that represent 
sources of important illegal migration flows directed towards Turkey or the EU Member States.”141 
Using the Readmission Agreement and irregular migration as measures for Turkey’s progress in 
fulfilling the Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime, the Commission noted that it would count 
“the number of third-country nationals, arrived to the EU or trying to cross the external borders of 
the EU, coming directly from the territory of Turkey, that were found with illegal travel 
                                                          
139 Egemen Bağış, “Visa restrictions are shutting Turkey out of the EU,” the Guardian, 14 July 2014, accessed 20 
March 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/14/visa-restrictions-turkey-eu. 
140 European Union, “Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey,” No. 20131216, 16 December 2013, 
accessed December 13 2015: 2. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-
roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf. 
141 Ibid, 5. 
76 
 
documents.”142 In other words, Turkey may only receive visa-free travel if it stops emigration from 
its territory into the European Union. The Readmission Agreement and the Roadmap for a Visa-
Free Regime allows the EU to push any obligation it has in providing refugee protection onto 
Turkey, so that Turkey can deal with the consequences on refugee flows.  
Notably, there were no conditions present in the Roadmap that would require Turkey to 
provide better or even adequate reception, processing, or return procedures for migrants who are 
irregularly residing in Turkey or who are attempting to make it to the EU. While the EU is quick 
to require Turkey to manage its migration, it does not provide the same types of preconditions for 
humanitarian treatment as it does for taking the obligation of refugee movements off the EU’s 
shoulders. Dangling the prospect of accession in front of Turkey, the Roadmap notes that the “entry 
into force of the readmission agreement will have a positive effect on the accession process of 
Turkey,”143 making clear that the EU’s priority is to stem migration flows and not necessarily to 
provide humanitarian relief to the refugee crisis.  
Additionally, the EU is able to shift the obligation of refugee status by supporting Turkey’s 
faulty asylum system and passing Turkey’s obligations to refugee protection as if they were 
sufficient. In the 2015 Progress Report, the Commission mentioned that, “despite commendable 
efforts by the authorities, around 500,000 refugee children have no access to education.”144 If the 
EU had wanted to convey the reality of education for refugees in Turkey, it would have put the 
number nearly four times higher, in line with UNHCR’s assessment that over 80% of school-aged 
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children are not attending school in Turkey.145 Even if we look within camps that has much higher 
school enrollment, we will see that still 20% of school age children are not enrolled,146 In any case, 
80% of refugees in Turkey live outside of camps and therefore have no access to education, in 
addition to other basic services.147 By calling Turkey’s efforts “commendable,” the EU is 
successfully reframing the obligation that the receiving state has for refugee status and 
significantly lowering the suite of rights that countries are expected to grant refugees. The 
implications of this is that we may see a back-pedaling on refugee rights within the EU and among 
its partners with which it engages in externalization policies, just as we have seen here with Turkey.  
V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have used the case study of EU-Turkish cooperation to explain how the 
concept of “refugee” is contested, and how it can be decontested through the political discourse of 
the dominant state actor. I showed how state interests in image and stability explain cooperation 
on refugee politics, and how these interests are expressed in political discourse through 
humanitarian or securitized framing. I then explained how this discourse has significant framing 
effects on how we conceptualize the cause and obligation of refugee and how this shift is then 
reflected through changing refugee policies.  
 As the EU struggles to manage the refugee crisis, it has looked to find strategic partners 
that can help it stem the influx of migrants, and one of these key partners is Turkey. Due to its 
unique relationship to the EU and its unfortunate relationship to the refugee crisis, Turkey can help 
slow EU immigration and for the prospect of EU accession in return. As the stronger state, the EU 
has more bargaining chips to cooperate on refugee protection and so it can successfully frame the 
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cause of the refugee in a way that will narrow its obligation while at the same time, provide a 
positive humanitarian image to its domestic and international audience. In addition, the EU is able 
to side-step its obligation and narrow the scope of refugee rights offered by embracing Turkey’s 
shortcoming in asylum policies and externalizing its own migration problem outside of its territory. 
In short, what we see from Turkish-EU cooperation is a dark side to refugee politics, in which 
changes in refugee framing are driven by state interests and state power more than humanitarian 
concern.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
In this thesis, I attempted to answer the question, what causes the definition of “refugee” 
to change over time? As it turns out, the answer is not a simple one – it is not one state actor that 
defines it, or one legal term that creates its framework. Instead, “refugee” is a politicized concept 
that changes in response to a changing environment and according to the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders. To begin to understand why it changes, we must first understand why refugee 
movements matter at all. As a regional public good, refugee movements will impact national and 
regional security, so states are interested in controlling refugee flows so as to reduce their negative 
consequences. Since “refugee” has no fixed definition, legal or otherwise, states may contest its 
definition and use a variety of meanings to describe it, depending on the image they wish to project. 
I simplify this image as falling under the frame of humanitarianism or under securitization, which 
gives us insight into the interests that are driving state actors to use these frames. As such, I 
simplified these driving interests as image and stability, in which a state actor will invoke a 
humanitarian frame when most interested in the former, and invoke a securitized frame when most 
interested in the latter. However, the most important takeaway from this analysis is about who gets 
to form the dominant frame on the refugee. As I have argued in this thesis, power between states 
will decide who gets to create the dominant frame, and I modeled this through the Suasion Game.  
 Now that we have understood the theoretical framework for how the refugee is contested 
and decontested, why should we care? At the base of this discussion, refugees are people. 
Sometimes they are people who have been granted legal status and have received a suite of rights; 
most of them are people displaced from their homes and found in dismal living conditions within 
the same region of the developing world. In our daily speech, “refugee” is a loose term – you may 
use it to describe your friend who lives down the street from you who is originally from Nepal, or 
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you may use it to describe the influx of people crossing from Turkey to Greece to Macedonia to 
Serbia and finally, to the EU. However, there is probably a big difference between the refugee you 
know down the street and the refugee you see on TV crossing EU borders - - the biggest difference 
being that the “refugee” you know has probably received more tangible benefits from his refugee 
status than did the “refugee” attempting to cross into Europe, who has probably received no 
benefits at all. Additionally, that “refugee” crossing in Europe is still very different from the one 
crossing from Eritrea into Egypt, and still different from the one crossing from Myanmar to 
Indonesia. But all of these “refugees” are probably ones you have heard of – but what about the 
ones you have not heard of? What about the people fleeing famine in South Sudan or genital 
mutilation on the Ivory Coast? What about Mexicans who cross the border to the US in search of 
safety from violence – are they still refugees?   
 We should care about how we define refugees because it has a real human impact. Without 
noticing, we have developed frameworks for what we think a refugee is and what claim to rights 
that refugee has, which varies depending on its nationality, circumstance, and the global political 
context that the refugee finds itself in at any given time. Most importantly, we should care about 
how we define the refugee because it is precisely due to our ignorance of its contested nature that 
politicians are able to use, manipulate, and endorse a specific vision of the refugee that suits their 
interests. In so doing, we stop caring about the people that fall out of this frame – those who are 
not politically salient enough for our politicians to claim responsibility for their struggle or their 
protection in any significant way.  We should care about how we define the refugee because we 
are including and excluding persons on terms that we may not agree with if were aware of them. 
If there is one intended effect from this thesis, it is for the reader to actively consider under what 
conditions he or she uses the term “refugee,” and who is and is not included in this frame.  
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Limitations and future research  
 In this thesis, I have tried to analyze the definition of the concept of “refugee” by exploring 
how and why the refugee is contested, and under what conditions it can be politically decontested. 
In order to do this, I have had to simplify the qualities that go into state behavior. For example, I 
claimed in this thesis that state interests in refugee matters converge around two central concerns: 
state stability and state image, and that this explains why states will invoke a securitized or 
humanitarian frame, respectively. I acknowledge that this might an oversimplification of state 
interests that might, in turn, oversimply the framing effect of political discourse.  
For example, I explain that humanitarian concern is of state interest because the state is 
interested in its image. With this assertion comes an assumption that 1) the public is interested in 
humanitarian issues, 2) that the state is concerned about its image, and 3) that the public plays a 
predominant role in shaping that image. Beginning with the first point, the public may not always 
be concerned with humanitarian issues. In fact, sometimes the public is most concerned with 
security issues, which would make state interests in stability and image two faces on the same coin. 
Furthermore, the state may not be interested in its image, or at least, this may not be the driving 
force to having a humanitarian frame. It may be possible that the state is interested in providing 
humanitarian relief and this explains a humanitarian frame, indifferent of the image this may 
project. Additionally, if the state is not democratic, for example, it may not care much for the 
image it creates on the public or the international community, especially if this image is merely 
projecting a humanitarian concern and not a material strength.  
While I do believe that image plays a significant role in rhetorical framing, it may not be a 
discrete category that can be contrasted to an interest in stability. If I were to continue refining this 
study, I would find a better explanatory variable that would include a wider range of reasons to be 
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concerned with state “image,” that goes beyond the restraints of humanitarian concern. For 
example, a state may wish to project an image of power upon the public and the international 
community, as I hint at in Chapter 3 when I explain why European powers during the Cold War 
take in refugees coming out of the Soviet Bloc.  
Another limitation to this study is the scope of my analysis. In this thesis, I argue that state 
power determines who gets to form the dominant frame on the refugee, but how is this power 
conceived and what is the scope of this frame? In this study, I did not have the time to dive into 
theories of power; however, relevant for my argument, it is important to understand what 
determinants I use to define a ‘more powerful’ state over another. Without a theoretical base on 
how power consolidates in international relations, I could misunderstand or over-exaggerate 
examples in history or in my case study in which I perceive power as the primary driver for change 
in refugee framing.  
Additionally, from this analysis we are still left with questions about the scope of the 
framing effect. How far-reaching is the frame created through political discourse? In the case-
study of EU-Turkish cooperation, we can see how the scope of the dominant frame created by EU 
political actors is regional in its scope: Macedonia closes its borders to Afghans, and Turkey adopts 
EU-style asylum policy. In the creation of the refugee regime following World War II, on the other 
hand, it is global in scope. In future research, it could be very interesting to look at how far-
reaching the dominant rhetoric is in forming a global image of the refugee.  
Finally, a central question we are left after this analysis is: could this theory work in cases 
outside of Europe, or where Europe is not presented as the most powerful actor in interstate 
cooperation? In the analysis presented here, we gain valuable insight into how Western Europeans 
have effectively created and shaped refugee politics within the region, but cannot be sure about 
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how asylum formed elsewhere in the world. Even if we agree that Europeans created the normative 
and legal concept of “refugee,” they are certainly not the only ones to use it. In future research 
projects, it would be insightful to look at how other powers establish frames about the refugee in 
other regions of the globe, such as the United States who, despite being arguably the strongest state 
in international relations, was left out entirely from this discussion.  
Final thought  
 In this thesis, I expose how the refugee is a contested concept, and how political leaders 
attempt to decontest its definition and form a dominant frame. The importance of this frame is that 
it can reshape our worldview, changing the ways in which we evaluate and value the refugees and 
who we include under its umbrella status. The concept of “refugee” is not unfamiliar to us; news 
of refugee flows overwhelming Europe and the Middle East are making headlines every day and, 
if nothing more, we should take the time to consider how we are actively framing the concept of 
“refugee” in the present context.  
 Having said that, I would like to leave the reader with a critical eye for refugee discourse 
and asylum policy. At the very least, I hope to have provided the reader with the tools for how to 
critically analyze the frame that they have built around the refugee, and how do the same when 
considering how this frame is being translated into asylum policies. Most importantly, I would like 
to leave the reader with a curiosity to ask, “who is a refugee, what do we owe refugees, and do I 
agree with this definition?”  
After having completed this project, I can personally say that I have grown a distaste for 
the term “refugee” because its humanitarian purpose seems to work as a façade for the political 
manipulation that structures its definition. I take refugee policies with a grain of salt, careful to 
support them in their entirety because for every person that it incorporates, another handful of 
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vulnerable persons are intentionally left out. In a world in which the global refugee population is 
growing, I hope that we keep in mind how we are choosing to frame the refugee in response.  
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